In a next step, Grice needs to explain what the difference between the meaning and further aspects of the use of an expression is. Nevertheless he denies that the correctness of this implication constitutes a condition for the truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. What is implied, in other words, is no Strawsonian presupposition Grice ff.
Hence what is implied does not contribute anything to the truth conditions of the utterance. It is not part of what was said by it, but owes itself to the use the speakers make of the sentence in question — and this is actually based on a meaning which has been captured by classical logic. Grice ; his emphasis This passage anticipates a lot of what Grice is going to elaborate on in his William James Lectures. And thus considered it is part of some Theory-theory as well see section 2. This, however, is not correct.
Grice is convinced that it is constitutive of the basic concept that a speaker by doing something under certain circumstances means something in doing so. The former, if one likes to put it this way, is to be achieved by the theory of conversation, the latter by the theory of meaning. For 8 Klaus Petrus this purpose, however, a solid and workable theory of meaning is called for see section 6. Theory of language In his William James Lectures Grice repeatedly indicates what the purpose of a theory of language should consist in. Grice ; first two emphases by Grice what U meant what U conventionally meant what U said what U nonconventionally meant what U conventionally implicated what U conversationally implicated what U particularized conversationally implicated Figure 1.
Roughly, this results in the spectrum shown above figure 1. Conversation and implicatures Grice is very concerned about stating the notions presented in figure 1. Without doubt, the concept of what is said plays a central role in this respect. On the one hand Grice seems to take the view that what is said by an utterance is a variety of what is meant, or that what is said can be explicated in terms of what is meant see figure 1.
On the other hand it is of eminent importance to the theory of conversation and the characterization of implicatures, insofar as implicatures are usually thus characterized, that U says something and means implicates something over and above that. For an identification of what is said one needs to fix the referents of these expressions, and to eliminate ambiguities.
The latter holds if the uttered sentence contains conventional devices which signal that U — as Grice puts it — over and above some central speech act performed a further, non-central speech act Grice If U utters the sentence: 4 Sally is poor but she is honest. This very expression, however, plays no part in determining what U said by 4.
In other words, the same is said in 4 and 5 : 5 Sally is poor and she is honest. This becomes immediately obvious since the conventional implicatum can be false without what is said being false as regards the difference between implicatures and presuppositions see section 3. Grasping them requires of the audience some extralinguistic considerations which provide the key for working out or calculating the implicature in question Grice 31, As regards conversational implicatures the assumption is, roughly speaking, that U cooperates or wants to make a meaningful contribution to the conversation by her utterance.
This in turn requires that, for instance, the utterer U and the addressee A know which purpose their conversation serves and know this of each other as well; but see Gu Maxims of Quantity: 1 Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purpose of the exchange ; 2 Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Maxims of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true; 1 Do not say what you believe to be false; 2 Do Introduction 11 not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. Maxims of Manner: Be perspicuous; 1 Avoid obscurity of expression; 2 Avoid ambiguity; 3 Be brief avoid unnecessary prolixity ; 4 Be orderly ibid. There has been much speculation about the interconnections of these conversational maxims CM , their status, their order of importance, or the possibility of a reduction of these maxims to just a few or even to one single maxim for an overview see Rolf ff.
Grice himself does not claim that this list is complete, or that the maxims are independent of one another ibid. At any rate it can be noted that the maxims which belong to CM are predominantly the kind of maxims which govern all rational communicative practices, at least insofar as typically linguistic purposes — as, for instance, the maximally effective exchange of information — are concerned.
It is exactly this very purpose of CP Grice has in mind, and to which he accordingly geared the maxims ibid. Even though Grice does not provide a definition of conversational implicatures, he nevertheless lists a number of important features Grice 30f. That by uttering x U conversationally implicates that p roughly means: a that by x U neither says nor conventionally implicates that q; b that x can only be grasped in accordance with CM or at least CP , if by x U means that p; and c that by x U means that p, while relying, among other things, on A recognizing that b.
Assuming that A wants to know whether Mr X makes a good philosopher, and thereupon U replies: 6 Mr X has excellent handwriting and is always very punctual by saying this, U clearly violates one or even several maxims e. This at least holds for those conversational implicatures which Grice is particularly interested in: particularized conversational implicatures see figure 1.
In contrast to generalized conversational implicatures it takes special characteristics of the context of the utterance in order to work them out as in example 6. Generalized implicatures on the other hand are relatively context-independent Hirschberg ; Levinson A violation of CM is not detected because the implicatum normally goes with the utterance. Yet there would be a violation if the implicatum was not meant as well 12 Klaus Petrus Grice 37ff.
Examples for generalized conversational implicatures are not merely sentences like 7 Mr X is meeting a woman this evening. Also sentences we have already come across in section 3 and which contain logical constants belong under this rubric as, for instance, 3 Mr X is in the kitchen or in the living room. By means of 3 it is normally implicated that the speaker U does not know in which of the two rooms Mr X is.
Apart from conversational implicatures, Grice mentions under the rubric of nonconventional implicatures en passant one further type: nonconventional nonconversational implicatures Grice 28; see figure 1. They differ from conventional implicatures insofar as it is not the case that they are generated on the basis of the conventional meaning of the uttered sentences. On the other hand they differ from conversational implicatures because other maxims than the ones Grice presented CM play a part in the inference to what is meant by U, such as, for instance, maxims of politeness.
Whether there exists a clear-cut distinguishing criterion between these maxims and CM is left open by Grice. As has already been mentioned, there are a lot of indications suggesting that Grice above all searched for maxims which — on the assumption that we are dealing with the maximally efficient exchange of information — govern all reasonable communication. Grice 31 Introduction 13 It has often been criticized that this pattern is psychologically implausible e.
Sperber and Wilson ; Recanati ; Gibbs Doing so presumes that CP and CM are socio-psychological and thus empirically verifiable instances of conversation. He does not want to claim that we do in fact follow these maxims, but rather that it is reasonable for us to follow them Grice The reasons are not of an extrinsic kind; i. According to Grice, these maxims seem rather to be of a subjective kind.
Grice 29f. As this passage shows, Grice at the same time seems to hold that CP and CM are observed ceteris paribus — and thus claim objective validity in certain respects. But what could that mean? With that goes, among other things, the capability of evaluating goals and means which serve the attainment of these goals ibid.
What U and A as well do in the actual case, becomes intelligible only if the participants mutually assume that they are essentially rational beings — and thus beings which ceteris paribus follow CP and CM in conversational exchange. In any case, the mutual supposition that CP and CM are observed would according to this interpretation bear objective validity insofar as it constitutes a condition of the possibility of conversation. Without this supposition the linguistic behaviour of those who engage in conversation would not be explainable at all.
This corresponds with his idea of a hierarchically structured edifice of sciences see figure 1. He conceives of the philosophy of language as a domain of rational psychology which for its part belongs to philosophical psychology. Given that these domains all together revolve around human rationality, it is a matter of consequence that they are dealing with aspects of this subject in an increasingly specialized manner.
The theory of conversation is such a sub-branch; its topic is linguistic behaviour insofar as it can be interpreted as rational behaviour. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the theory of conversation has another side too. As explained in section 3. It is exactly this very purpose the theory of conversation has to serve as a methodological tool: to prevent that meaning and use are telquel identified. And in methodological respects it serves as an instrument for the distinction between meaning and use.
As we shall see later on, it has made a contribution to the theory of Introduction 15 rationality as well see below, section 6. At the same time it serves an important methodological purpose. Even though Grice is against an identification of meaning with use, this does not mean that the one has nothing to do with the other. On the contrary, Grice is firmly convinced that the meaning of an expression is a function of what a speaker U does with it or what she means by it Neale as well as this chapter, section 3.
In this context, Grice needs, among other things, to clarify what it actually means to mean something by an utterance. Roughly speaking, his analysis consists of two steps. In a first step, the nonnatural meaning of a certain utterance x is equated with what a certain speaker U meant by x under certain circumstances.
What she meant by x is in turn explicated by which effect U intended to produce in an audience A. If 1 — 3 are present, U meant, or in brief: M-intended, something by uttering x. What exactly U meant by uttering x results, according to Grice, from a specification of the reaction r intended on the part of A ibid. Hence Grice explicates both the fact that U meant something by x, and the fact of what she means by uttering x, in terms of psychological concepts. In the first case it is the concept of intention, whereas in the second case it is the concept of as Grice calls it the M-intended effect, which is always a propositional attitude on the part of A.
Therefore it is central to determine the status as well as the role of these concepts in 16 Klaus Petrus respect of the explanation of linguistic acts. This is a project Grice does not realize within the framework of his theory of meaning but within his philosophical psychology or rational psychology Grice —61, ; see Grandy and Warner a: 15ff. Intentions 1 — 3 have been the subject of extensive and lengthy debates e. Strawson ; Searle ; Schiffer Disregarding the technical problems of the Gricean analysis, one thing stands out immediately: conventions do not occur. In fact it is the crux of this approach that for U meaning something by x it is not necessary that there exists a previously conventionally established relation between the means by which something is meant a gesture, a drawing, or even the utterance of a sentence and what is meant.
Nevertheless Grice does of course not want to deny that there is something like conventional meaning. But what is meant, i. Also he does not deny that, in a certain respect, linguistic acts are always conventional acts, namely insofar as their medium e. Yet Grice thinks that such acts could, at least in principle, be performed without conventions as well.
This idea, by the way, has some far-reaching consequences. Already in the s it was applied to the analysis of a central type of linguistic actions, viz. The debate between intentionalists and conventionalists goes on to this day see Petrus Finally, Grice does not want to deny either that especially in the case of linguistic communication conventional means are often used to mean something which exceeds what is said. Conversational implicatures are the apt example for this see section 5. As has already been emphasized in section 5, it is the concept of what is said which is important to Grice in order figure out conventional as well as conversational implicatures, which themselves in turn are a variety of what is meant by the speaker see figure 1.
Presented in a simplified way, Grice aims at proving the conceptual dependencies illustrated in figure 1. The arrows in the scheme, i. In a second step this analysis is used in the analysis of the meaning of an utterance-type.
What is said by an utterance is then explicated in terms of 1 and 2 , and after that what is implicated 4 is explicated in terms of 2 and 3. The first part consists in an analysis of 1 , which is to be achieved by GA , i. The second part consists in showing that 3 can be analysed on the basis of 2 , and that 2 in turn can be analysed on the basis of 1. Roughly speaking, its point is that the speaker U makes certain assumptions about what could lead the addressee A to produce the reaction r intended by U.
The reason for producing this reaction should, according to Grice, rather be one which U herself provides to A. In other words, it is exactly this recognition which should be among others a reason — and not merely a cause Grice 92 — for A to produce the reaction intended by U, i. In a simplified version, the pattern of the Gricean mechanism for assertive utterances looks as follows Kemmerling : GM i ii iii iv By x-ing U intends A to believe that p.
A recognizes that i. A believes because of ii that if i then p. Therefore: A believes that p. In this respect GM can be conceived of as an intention-fulfilling-mechanism Kemmerling But it would be wrong to assume that ii is always sufficient for A to produce the reaction r intended by U. It is likely that A makes further assumptions, and that these assumptions count as additional reasons to believe that p. Either way it is assumed in this model that it is — as Grice occasionally puts it — within the rational control of A to produce the reaction intended by U. But in GA there is no mention of this at all.
The analysis only requires that U has certain intentions. Therefore it is important to note that the above statements about A are strictly speaking assumptions which U makes about A. That U relies on the Gricean mechanism is to say that U presumes that it is within the rational control of A to produce the reaction intended by her — and not that this reaction is actually within the control of A see Petrus ff.
That U makes suchlike assumptions has its reason and reveals the deeperlying rationality, which is inherent to the Gricean theory of meaning. In other words, if U did not rely on the Gricean mechanism, and did not make the relevant assumptions about A, she herself would have no good reason to do what she is up to. It is only on the assumption that U relies on the Gricean mechanism that her behaviour can be explained as rational behaviour at all.
But this objection is liable to miss the point. What matters to Grice is to work out mechanisms and concepts which are indispensable to making explicable the behaviour of beings which, in the Gricean sense, mean something by a sign. And a crucial part of this explanation is provided by the Gricean mechanism. Rather — or more precisely, at the same time — it serves a methodological purpose. Although meaning and use are not to be identified see section 3.
According to him, the meaning of an utterance is rather a function of its use. Analogous to the theory of conversation, the theory of meaning too has always its two sides: as a philosophical domain it covers a certain domain of a general theory of rationality; its topic is rational linguistic behaviour. And in methodological respects it serves as an instrument to show that meaning is a function of use.
Meaning, saying, implicating In section 6. The second part — the Gricean programme — is concerned with making use of this analysis when it comes to the explication of the meaning of an utterance-type and what is said. As can be seen in figure 1. In order to say something by X, X has to possess a certain feature: doing X needs to be a linguistic act Grice For the sake of simplicity, let us say that according to these 20 Klaus Petrus conditions what is said is syntactically correlated with the sentence uttered by U see section 7.
Off-hand it may well seem as if what is said coincides with a special sort of meaning of an utterance-type, namely with sentence-meaning. This, however, is not correct either. Even if we disregard for a moment the problems which are posed by indexical and ambiguous expressions see section 5.
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Examples for this are provided by instances of non-literal speech such as irony Grice Assuming somebody utters sentence 8 ironically: 8 Fred is an honest man. But it would be wrong to say that by 8 U said that Fred is an honest man. The reason for this is that by uttering 8 U did not mean that Fred is an honest man: U has not the intention to make A believe that Fred is an honest man. If at all, by 8 U has made as if to say that Fred is an honest man ibid.
Thus what is said in the strict sense is always a variety of what is meant see figures 1. But this too is not yet correct. This time, the reason is constituted by the conventional implicatures. Assuming U utters the sentence: 4 Sally is poor but she is honest. Grice would not want to deny that both what U means by 4 , and what this sentence means is that Sally is poor but honest.
Grice, H. P. (H. Paul)
Nevertheless he disputes that U said so ibid. As explained in section 5. Grice rather thinks that by 4 U performs two speech acts — a central one and a non-central one — and that only the propositional content of the central speech act is to be regarded as part of what is said. For this reason he stipulates that what is said is strictly speaking a form of what is centrally meant ibid. In the meantime a number of competing positions have evolved — literalism, minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, or syncretism — and an end to the debate is not within sight.
Indeed, this debate poses a challenge to Grice as well. The problem with what is said now results from the observation that many perhaps even most sentences of a natural language — even after the determination of the referents of indexical expressions, and after disambiguation — do not express a content which possesses features i — iii. Accordingly, nothing is said by all these sentences, at least in the Gricean sense. Let us consider the following examples: 9 Maria departs.
Although these uttered sentences are syntactically complete, 9 and 10 are nevertheless semantically incomplete. They do not express a proposition, but at best a propositional radical Bach ; but see Cappelen and Lepore In other words, nothing is said by these sentences, since feature ii is not present. In order to express a proposition, they need to be completed, that is to say it must be specified from where Maria departs, and what Gioacchino is too old for see Bach This completion needs to be done in accordance with what U meant by these sentences, and thus depends on the context of the utterance.
Nevertheless it is questionable to what extent the so-specified content still does justice to requirement i — at least if syntactic correlation, as suggested by Grice, requires that every element of what is said correspond to some element of the uttered sentence. If one held this opinion, all features i — iii would be fulfilled, and by sentence 10 , for example, it would be said in the Gricean sense that Gioacchino is too old to play in the football team. Otherwise nothing would be said by it. Once again we are dealing with syntactically complete sentences.
Moreover they are — unlike 9 and 10 — semantically complete: they express a proposition, and thus fulfil requirement ii. Yet it is — normal circumstances provided — highly unlikely that these sentences express what U meant by them. It is to be expected that U meant something more specific than he explicitly expressed. But then they do not possess the required feature iii.
Accordingly, the proposition expressed by these sentences needs to be expanded in accordance with what U meant Bach a; Carston ; 21ff. Nevertheless, the question whether the thus specified content still does justice to requirement i arises once more. If it were answered in the affirmative, all the features i — iii would be given, and by 12 it would be said that Maria has nothing appropriate for the party to put on.
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- Grice, H. P. (H. Paul).
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Otherwise nothing would be said. According to the minimal conception of what is said, only the content resulting after reference fixation of indexical expressions and disambiguation ought to be regarded as what is said. As a consequence of this conception, what is said needs always to fulfil the requirement of syntactical correlation, viz. What is said by 10 is therefore that Gioacchino is too old; what is said by 11 is correspondingly that Maria and Gioacchino are engaged.
According to the propositional conception of what is said, what is said must always be truth-evaluable, that is to say, needs to possess feature ii. Accordingly, the content of an utterance needs where necessary to be completed in such a way that a complete proposition is expressed by the sentence Introduction 23 in question. Everything else — and thus any possible expansions — is not counted as being part of what is said.
According to the maximal conception of what is said, what is said ought not only to be truth-evaluable, but also and always to state the proposition meant by U. Accordingly, the content of an uttered sentence needs where necessary not only to be completed, but also to be expanded. What is said by 11 is therefore that Gioacchino is too old to play in the football team; and what is said by 12 is that Maria and Gioacchino are engaged to each other.
There are a lot of reasons speaking for and against these various conceptions of what is said. Which of them is finally chosen may well depend on the theoretical purpose that the concept of what is said is to serve. As has been emphasized several times, Grice himself makes high demands on this concept: what is said constitutes the interface between the two facets of his theory of language, viz.
Since the delimitation of what is implicated and what is said also depends on the question of which components within the total meaning of an utterance contribute to its truth conditions, it may well be supposed that Grice would favour the propositional conception of what is said — though together with the, to his mind crucial, remark that the completion in question where necessary ought to be carried out in accordance with what U meant by her utterance since what is said is always a form of what is meant.
While doing so Grice would of course have to admit that he has overlooked the problem of semantic underdeterminacy which results from sentences like 9 and A lot speaks for regarding cases like 12 as a particular form of non-literality. Although all the components of the uttered sentence are to be taken literally, the utterance as a whole needs to be interpreted in a nonliteral sense Bach b. On this assumption U would, strictly speaking, have said nothing by 12 — as in the case of irony — but merely made as if to say that Maria has nothing to put on see section 7.
Whether this is the route Grice would have taken in view of all the problems, is, as indicated, quite controversial. The general frame of his theory of rationality is constituted by metaphysics. Within this province exists a multitude of domains which look at the subject in increasingly more specific ways.
Among them rank philosophical psychology, rational psychology, and — last but not least — the philosophy of language: its preferred, specialized field of research is defined by linguistic behaviour insofar as it can be interpreted as rational behaviour. Grice always claimed to develop theories with the most general explanatory force possible.
Thus regarded, it is crucial to his philosophical work to always and constantly reflect upon the principles of theory construction. This question is posed in all scientific branches, and consequently also in the philosophy of language. Answering this question is within the scope of Theory-theory. In this respect Grice seems to be firmly convinced that this methodological enterprise is not something which is exterior to the theory of language, or a mere addition from outside. Rather as the name suggests Theory-theory is a component of this theory of an aspect of human rationality.
The chapters In the anthology at hand, most aspects mentioned in this introduction are deepened and sometimes controversially discussed. In her contribution, Siobhan Chapman sheds light on the complex relationship between Grice and ordinary language philosophy OLP. Anne Bezuidenhout devotes her contribution to the debate between Russell and Strawson about the status of implications of existence and uniqueness associated with the use of definite descriptions.
Wayne Davis has a close look at different types of negations that are not used in accordance with standard rules of logic, and raises, among others, the question of whether such irregular negations are pragmatically or semantically ambiguous. In his opinion, an implicature theory works well only for evaluative implicature denials, while other irregular negations are semantically ambiguous in an unusual way. In her contribution, Mandy Simons argues for a reconceptualization of conversational implicatures, according to which they ought to be conceived of as inferences generated by observations about what a speaker has merely expressed.
This includes observations about sentence parts whose content is 26 Klaus Petrus not part of what is asserted. In order to show how Gricean maxims can be applied to non-asserted content, Simons offers some reformulations of the maxims, especially of the first part of the maxim of Quantity. Saul comes to the conclusion that abandoning Speaker Meaning Exhaustiveness is the preferable alternative, which moreover leaves us with an interesting theory of conversational implicatures as a normative notion.
The central topic of the contribution of Judith Baker is the role of rationality, which was repeatedly emphasized in the course of this introduction. However, Baker is primarily interested in the relation of practical reasons to rationality and focuses on one particular claim and the arguments that support it, i.
Mitchell Green, for his part, deals with meaning and communication and tries to revitalize the discussion of illocutionary force by relating it to social norms. In particular, he argues that force is an aspect of speaker-meaning and that according to new research in the evolutionary biology of communication, speaker- and natural meaning are more complexly interrelated than current consensus allows.
Klaus Petrus too concerns himself with the relation between illocution and Gricean-style communication. It is, however, appropriate for one kind of speech acts which are easily confused with illocutionary acts and which are communicative acts indeed: perillocutionary acts. Communicative acts are likewise the topic of the contribution of Christian Plunze. He goes into the claim that the recognition of a communicative intention implies communication which allows different interpretations. According to one interpretation, it is appropriate to speak of successful communication if the communicative intention is recognized.
According to another interpretation, the fact that the addressee does not recognize this intention does not show that the speaker does not communicate at all. Plunze offers an account of communicative acts which enables him to explain why the latter interpretation holds. According to Martinich, what is said is as much a component of pragmatics as is what is implicated.
This modified Gricean theory requires a defence against criticisms of the concept of what is said advanced by some minimalists, as well as against criticisms of the concept of what is said and conversationally implicated advanced by some contextualists. Introduction 27 Emma Borg takes such a minimalist point of view. Her starting point is the fact that in recent literature the precise account Grice offered of implicature recovery has been questioned and alternative approaches have emerged from different semantic programmes. Nikola Kompa goes into semantic minimalism as well and contrasts it with different versions of contextualism.
By looking at various forms of context sensitivity, Kompa tries to show the basic set assumption to be mistaken. Finally Laurence Horn presents once more an overview of the lively debate about the status of conversational implicatures and their relation to what is said. Horn makes the case for a relatively orthodox Gricean notion of what is said and tries to show that a minimally modified Gricean model provides a satisfying approach to the fundamental distinction between what is said and what is meant.
I agree with the latter. However, I believe that Grice did indeed perceive this work on philosophy of language, in particular, within a wider framework. I dedicate this piece of work to Andreas Graeser. References Austin, J. Atlas, J. Avramides, A. Tsohatzidis ed.
Bach, K. Linguistics and Philosophy, — Synthese, 15— Midwest Studies in Philosophy, — Baker, J. Journal of Philosophy, — Bennett, J. Bianchi, C. Borg, E. Cappelen, H. Chapman, S. Carston, R. Kempson ed. Cosenza, G. Frege, G. Eine logische Untersuchung. Gibbs, R. Brain and Language, — Grandy, R. Grandy and R. Warner eds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35 suppl.
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Kasher, A. Kasher ed. Kemmerling, A. Grewendorf ed. Sprechakttheorie und Semantik Frankfurt a. Stechow and D. Wunderlich eds. Cosenza ed. Levinson, S. Lewis, D. Loar, B. Pragmatics, — Meggle, G. Neale, S. Petrus, K. Logos, 3: — Gfeller and C. Walser eds. Linguistische Berichte, — Pfister, J. Preyer, G. Quine, W. Recanati, F. Mind and Language, 3: — Cognitive Science, — Russell, B. Mind, — Saul, J. Sbisa, M. Schiffer, S. Searle, J. Sperber, D. Oxford: Blackwell [1st edn, ]. Stanley, J. Strawson, P. Philosophical Review, — Szabo, Z.
Truniger, J. Unplublished MA thesis, University of Zurich. Warner, R. Grice , pp. It is one of initial enthusiasm, growing uneasiness and distance, but continued loyalty. Along with John L. Austin and Peter F. Strawson, Grice is one of the philosophers now most readily associated with the Oxford-based movement. Indeed his theory of conversation is widely regarded, among linguists at least, as one of the most successful products of OLP. And he continued to return to this in his later work, some of it conducted decades after the decline of OLP and thousands of miles away from Oxford.
But there is another side to the story. The divergence, however, which seems to be highly irrational as far as efficiency is concerned will turn out to be highly rationally motivated — with politeness being the main reason for this process. In the following, I will 1 sketch out the maxims according to which effective communication takes place and 2 analyse the reasons why it is sometimes advisable to intentionally counteract to the requisite maxims.
For this purpose, I will refer to different works of well known linguists, especially to the model of politeness suggested by Brown and Levinson It is the final aim of this paper to reanalyse the model put forward by these two linguists and, thereby, evaluate to what extent their model covers politeness phenomena. According to the language philosopher H. Maxim of quantity : - This maxim relates to the requirement that one should give all the necessary information one has for the present needs of the partner - not too much but not too little, either. Maxim of quality : Try to make your contribution one that is true - The maxim of quality requires that we only give true information for which we have evidence.
Cooperative speakers are expected to speak the truth - Do not say what you believe is false - Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Maxim of manner : - be perspicuous - avoid obscurity of expression - avoid ambiguity - be brief - be orderly. This becomes clear when we turn to phenomena such as metonymy or metaphor. These must often be labelled expressions that are obscure on the surface. However, they help us to express ideas which cannot be expressed in another way than by means of figural language. In that sense they are no longer ambiguous in actual fact.
We can therefore conclude that the maxim of manner must be extended in a way that it does not exclude figurative language. Again, the reason is a special communicative effect as they are used as opting out devices Grice, , p. They also signal the hearer that the speaker is violating at least one of the maxims quoted above . Further difficulties arise from the fact that we often say things implicitly. If, for example. The speech act, however, simply expresses that I think it is cold — but does not request any action from you. Here, I violate the maxim of manner . Consequently, in real talk exchange the hearer often has to read between the lines.
On the basis of what has just been said it becomes clear that the hearer apart from implementing the above maxims is required to interpret a number of utterances on the basis of their implications: He must find out to what extent the information and the communicative intentions are given implicitly. Since this extra information is redundant the speaker obviously violated the maxims of quality and relevance. But because this is actually the case the hearer will read more into the utterance than was explicitly said and seek the relevant information: He will interpret the utterance as a request to do something about the situation rather than a description of it .
Implications like that which follow from conversational maxims are called implicatures according to Grice, , pp. Grice distinguishes between conversational and conventional implicatures:. This is the information which is inferred but not literally expressed in the utterance. Bayer, J. In: W. Abraham, ed. Descriptive and theoretical investigations on the logical, syntactic and pragmatic properties of discourse particles in German. Amsterdam: Benjamins, — Briscoe, T. In: P. Viegas, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, — Brown, G.
Yule : Discourse Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carston, R. Lingua 90, 27— In: R. Asher, ed. Oxford: Pergamon Press, — Lingua 96, — Clark, E. Cohen, J. In: Y. Bar-Hillel, ed. Dordrecht: Reidel, 50— Crystal, D. In: M.
Bridges, ed. Fodor, J. Foldi, N. Brain and Language 31, 88— Garfield, J. In: J. Garfield, ed. Gazdar, G. Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form. New York: Academic Press. Gibbs, R. Figurative thought, language, and understanding. Green, G. Hillsdale, N. Grice, H. In: H. Grice: Studies in the way of words.
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Groeben, N. Scheele : Produktion und Rezeption von Ironie. Pragmalinguistische Beschreibung und psycholinguistische Beschreibungshypothesen. Harnish, R. Lingua 63, — Hirschberg, J. PhD thesis. University of Pennsylvania. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International. Horn, L.