These patterns were evident throughout Bosnia. Early ideas to target assistance toward communities that respected minority rights and encouraged returns had largely been set aside, at least for The absence of jobs engendered anxiety that what little employment there was would be taken by returnees. Lost property was also an enormous issue. Politically, the progress of reconciliation would be manifest in upcoming elections. Contrary to widespread fears about their outcome, Ambassador McKinley believed that the elections were not yet foreclosed.
Over forty political parties had registered to run candidates, some with impressive numbers of backers. A significant opposition appeared to exist even within the Republika Srpska, and polling indicated growing interest in the election. Moreover, voting by displaced persons and refugees, who constituted one-half the potential electorate, was a wildcard that could substantially influence outcomes.
Legally, the pace of bringing war criminals to justice was slow. Indicted war criminals had largely escaped arrest, and the main tool available to influence that pace - economic sanctions - could interfere with other postwar goals. The Dayton Accords created what Ambassador McKinley described as an ad hoc framework for coordinating international implementation efforts.
Major civilian responsibilities were given to lead agencies: the UN for civilian police monitoring and the turnover of the last Serb enclave in Croatia; the World Bank for reconstruction; the EU for some reconstruction and the administration of Mostar; UNHCR for repatriation and humanitarian operations; and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE for managing elections, human rights, and arms control arrangements.
This organizational arrangement was presided over by a High Representative, Dr. There were some problems, however: the High Representative had more responsibility than authority; there was no mechanism to compel military-civilian cooperation, especially at the strategic level; and a glut of "coordinators" made it difficult to get decisions made promptly. There also remained a mismatch between the ambitious postwar political agenda for Bosnia and the desire for quick results.
Ambassador McKinley did not see sufficient long-term commitment by governments, even though all realized that Bosnia needed long-term support. For now, those living in Bosnia or anticipating return were awaiting the outcome of elections, and the most that could be expected was perhaps a three-year time horizon that matched the World Bank's reconstruction plan. Discussion among panelists and participants took up several issues, from Dr. Woodward's analysis of the war's causes and the dynamics of postwar economic reconstruction to the role of the International Criminal Tribunal.
Dominating the discussion, however, were diverging assessments of the Dayton Accords, both in their internal coherence and in their implementation. Malloch Brown from the World Bank questioned Dr. Woodward's identification of structural adjustment as central to Yugoslavia's disintegration. Critics of structural adjustment often confused cause and effect, he argued. Yugoslavia's meltdown had certainly involved the painful adjustment to a free-market economy. Yet, any transition from a protected, inefficient economy to a more liberal one involved a brutal period of adjustment, with or without the advice of international financial institutions.
Yugoslavia's dramatic dislocations were not caused by the World Bank, even if the Bank might have been more helpful in assisting the country in transition to manage them. The challenge now, argued a series of participants, was convincing the international community to stay the course it had begun in post-war Bosnia. Confirming this view, Mr.
Increasingly, he felt, the World Bank would have to aggressively expose donors for not coming through, especially as political pressure to contribute subsided. Malloch Brown explained that the World Bank had acted as promptly as it did, including contributing from its own net income, because it viewed Bosnia as an economy capable of returning quickly to a high level of economic performance, even if its per capita income had fallen by 80 to 90 percent.
He was more concerned that the international community would recklessly fail to sustain its commitment beyond the three-year time frame of the Bank's program. Bosnia needed longer-term engagement along the lines of the Marshall Plan. Having allowed its leading financial institution to offer large sums of money in loans, the international community had to follow the effort in Bosnia through.
Otherwise, five years from now, there would be renewed fighting and an enormous, new debt. Several participants noted that the greatest short-term challenge was Bosnia's capacity to absorb and disperse what resources did arrive. There were also major problems in reaching agreements with the parties in the Federation and Republika Srpska about the distribution of funds. According to Mr. But for lenders who had to deal with national governments and for reconstruction generally, this posed major obstacles.
One observer commented that international aid, while helping to create jobs, was also a source of leverage within the country which could deepen political tensions. There also was an "unholy alliance" between the criminal mafia and local authorities that could become enmeshed with the distribution of aid and fuel the resurgence of paramilitary groups. Zulu from the IMF noted that his organization had gone into Bosnia immediately in December , not only to organize Bosnia's membership in the IMF and help it clear arrears but also to give basic technical assistance.
It had known that Bosnia would need to have in place a functioning financial system to receive whatever aid would be given. These efforts are also designed to catalyze resources, as well as create confidence for others who might come in. Unfortunately, it had as yet received little support from local authorities in setting up a central bank or any of the ancillary structures that would be needed. There was no trust among the three constituent authorities of post-war Bosnia, and the IMF found itself negotiating with three different authorities at every stage.
Apart from their own limitations, such as the requirement of working with a central government, international financial institutions could not be expected to outpace the willingness and cooperation of parties on the ground. On a more hopeful note, Ms.
Rehn, UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia, described what she saw as reconstruction taking place on its own, apart from unrealized expectations of international assistance. Sarajevo had new shops, restaurants, and new windows, and Banja Luka seemed genuinely to be reviving. She questioned, moreover, Dr. Woodward's suggestion that the focus on war criminals, especially on Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, had been excessive. Although she recognized that the level of international attention had, to an extent, made them local heroes, she disagreed with the notion that bringing them to justice would make no difference.
Having talked with thousands who had lost loved ones, she believed that ordinary people could not contemplate lasting peace until the primary agents of violence had been brought to justice. Participants widely acknowledged the continuing tension between the stated goal of a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina and unrelenting pressures for partition, which had not been resolved by the Dayton Accords. Ambassador Mwakawago raised a specific concern about the viability of the Muslim-Croat Federation, which several participants working on the ground amplified, describing extreme distrust and non-cooperation between the Muslim and Croat communities.
Most also expressed concern over the fragility of the settlement. The Dayton agreement was widely acknowledged as a necessary, but extremely preliminary, first step, which needed to be followed by significant, long-term international engagement. The peace accords did not actually amount to a "settlement" but only a cease-fire, upon which the parties still had to build. Still, one participant from the human rights community argued that negotiated settlements necessarily entailed ambiguity.
The more serious problem post-Dayton was analogous to that of the United Nations Protection Force UNPROFOR , or the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, where strategies and plans had been clear and specified, but international actors had little willingness or capacity to implement them. Woodward noted, however, what she viewed as a profound contradiction in the text of the Accords, especially between the goal of a multi-ethnic state and those provisions that reinforced ethnic segregation: basing most political representation on group membership, allowing whatever parliament emerges from September's elections to establish "special relationships" with neighbors, and permitting Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to confederate with Croatia and Serbia.
A European ambassador to the UN expressed concern about the imbalance between implementing military and civilian tasks. This tension indicated to him that the UN might be uniquely suited to accomplishing civilian tasks and therefore deserving of sufficient resources to do so. He also saw a potentially destabilizing tension in the Dayton Accords' military provisions between simultaneous strategies of "building down" the overall level of weaponry between the parties and "building up" Bosnian forces, particularly in an area already awash in arms.
Making Peace Work
In addition, although the Accords' military timetable had largely been kept, both the cantonment of heavy weapons and demobilization of forces were unlikely to be completed before the elections in September. Nonetheless, the Dayton Accords afforded a singular opportunity to build peace, Ambassador McKinley argued. Polls showed that people throughout Bosnia wanted the elections to take place on course, a view with which Ms.
Rehn concurred. Ambassador McKinley further noted that the Federation between Muslims and Croats was central to lasting settlement, even if common institutions were slow to develop and each party was reluctant to yield power from its respective center to the Federation. Rehn also suggested that international observers had overreacted to developments such as the declaration of a separate parliament for Bosnian Croats, particularly when leading Croatians, like Mate Granic, had publicly criticized the move.
Across the board, participants affirmed the need for long-term international engagement in Bosnia. It would be a great pity for the international community to be in such a hurry to disengage that Bosnia ended up with a premature and unnecessary partition. To rush any of the critical post-war processes was to risk wasting the resources already invested. Jessen-Petersen noted that he saw a clear will to work for peace among ordinary people in Bosnia.
From them, the international community could not walk away. Ambassador Mwakawago introduced the case of Rwanda by contrasting it with the post-conflict situation in the former Yugoslavia. He concentrated upon elements which characterized the Rwandan case, namely post-conflict population movements both to and from the country, as well as what he perceived as a lack of commitment from the international community.
Minister Jan Pronk gave a critical assessment of international involvement in the region, and offered a set of recommendations for future policy. Faubert focused on the issue of refugee repatriation, sketching the complex post-conflict situation within which UNHCR worked as it tried to protect, assist and voluntarily repatriate thousands of Rwandan refugees. He also noted that relevant governments and world leaders showed little political interest in brokering lasting solutions for the region.
Guest in turn affirmed the need for a long-term approach to refugee repatriation, arguing that impunity for perpetrators of the genocide had to end prior to any large-scale return program. Both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia had suffered enormously, Ambassador Mwakawago noted. Nevertheless, their situations differed greatly in the consequences of each conflict and in the respective levels of commitment by the international community to usher in and sustain peace. The violence in Rwanda resulted in the creation of about 2 million "new" refugees, who were mostly Hutu.
Zaire hosted 1. The return of many of the "old" refugees from gave weight to the argument that in post-conflict Rwanda, in contrast to the former Yugoslavia, a clear winner and governmental authority were well established. Ambassador Mwakawago criticized the role of the UN during Rwanda's genocide. The UN had been present in but with an inappropriate mandate and dramatically insufficient resources.
In his view, this made the international community partly responsible for what had transpired. Now, as Rwandans faced the very difficult task of "healing the wounds," he criticized what he perceived as a lack of donor commitment to the rebuilding of their country. In order to help heal the wounds, Ambassador Mwakawago appealed to the donor community to extend assistance to the new Government of Rwanda which is struggling under very difficult conditions to restore normalcy.
Minister Pronk elaborated on the role of the international community in Rwanda as he reviewed his government's policies prior to and during the genocide and the refugee emergency which followed thereafter. When the Government of the Netherlands had decided to halt direct assistance to the former Rwandan government, he had recommended that they provide humanitarian assistance instead.
It later became clear, however, that this recommendation had allowed humanitarian assistance to substitute for political action. Minister Pronk also noted earlier mistakes in the provision of peacetime development assistance and the underlying policy guidelines pursued by his and other governments. He believed Rwandans were pressured to democratize too quickly and according to a Western model, encouraging the development of an elite which found it easier to destroy perceived adversaries than to share limited economic benefits.
Neither development nor humanitarian assistance policies were based on a thorough analysis of the particular social, cultural, and economic situation in Rwanda. Instead, they were implemented in the easiest manner possible, without any field-level coordination with other actors to complement rather than duplicate activities. The effectiveness of the assistance was further reduced because there was no mechanism in place to respond to the clear signs of impending disaster.
The United Nations peacekeeping force was moreover given an improper mandate to keep the two Rwandan armies apart, rather than to protect civilians. The interweaving of each of these factors inextricably led to the catastrophe that ensued. Turning to policy proposals for Rwanda's future, Minister Pronk called on the international community to support the efforts of the current government to build a nation without ethnic prejudice despite continued violent incidents within Rwanda since , noting that skepticism on the part of the international community was undermining the government at a time when it needed confidence-building support.
Although an enormous amount of international financial support had gone to the physical reconstruction of Rwanda, there had been little investment in the rebuilding of civil society.
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The slow financial support for restoring the justice system was especially "shameful. Support and assistance should instead be provided to the host countries. It was vital, first, to bring to justice those who had committed genocide. Initiating dialogue with the perpetrators of the genocide and ignoring the question of justice would only ensure that genocide would recur.
At present, former military personnel, militia members, perpetrators of genocide and real refugees lived side-by-side in the camps, a lethal combination which could explode into violence and new acts of genocide at any time. The recent outbreak in the Masisi region of Zaire was a case in point.
Minister Pronk further noted that the will and initiative to resolve conflicts and to rebuild society must come from the reunited peoples of Rwanda and Burundi themselves, and that any solution must take into account regional political forces. He suggested, however, that the international community had a role to play in providing humanitarian assistance and in helping to shape political strategies to rebuild the societies in both countries. Faubert began with a review of the repatriation operations to Rwanda. While approximately 20 percent of the refugees had returned between and the end of , he noted that in alone, the number of births in camps had been equal to the number of returns.
UNHCR had tried numerous measures to resolve the refugee problem quickly, pushing the limits of its mandate to do so. However, it was now clear that such a quick-fix solution was unrealistic as it did not resolve the underlying problems. Instead, a comprehensive approach was needed, which would include continued voluntary repatriation, although at a slower pace to allow for progress to be made in restoring accountability and addressing the complex root causes of the conflict.
Retrospective analysis of these root causes brought to light the historical reliance in Rwanda, as well as in Burundi, on politics of ethnic exclusion and the development of ethnically based national armies. The recent genocide was also a logical consequence of a continuing cycle of impunity and fear, which had to be interrupted.
Another, often neglected, element of analysis was the lack of adequate land for the large agrarian population in both countries. In , Rwanda had a population density approximately equal to that of the United Kingdom, which as an industrialized nation, could support such a density. For Rwanda's agrarian economy, however, it was far too high. In order to heal Rwanda's most recent wounds and pave the way for refugee return, these problems had to be resolved.
Faubert emphasized, however, that various processes of rebuilding peace could and should occur simultaneously. The link between repatriation and reconciliation had become what he termed a "quasi-theological debate". While there were those who felt that the repatriation of refugees to Rwanda was a major and necessary condition for reconciliation and others who believed that repatriation would only come as a result of genuine national reconciliation, Mr. Faubert felt that neither was a prerequisite for the other. He strongly argued that assistance, arrest of war criminals in the camps, trials, and refugee return, all be treated as part of the same ongoing process.
The establishment of a functioning, independent judiciary in Rwanda remained central to both repatriation and reconciliation. At the same time, it was extremely important to isolate the former Hutu leaders who had organized the original exodus and had since been intimidating refugees to prevent them from returning to Rwanda. Faubert questioned current perceptions that the Rwandan conflict was divided into two "sides", arguing that Rwanda was responsible for all of its nationals inside and outside of the country.
This perception of division was fostered in part by intimidation in the refugee camps but also by the depiction in some quarters in Rwanda that everyone in the refugee camps was responsible for acts of genocide. This characterization was wrong and equally needed to be corrected. Faubert agreed with Minister Pronk that the international community had allowed humanitarian assistance to substitute for serious political action during and after the conflict. It was particularly difficult for UNHCR, which felt that its work to assist and protect the refugees was expected to substitute for the lack of interest among international leaders in forging a political solution to the region's problems.
Faubert called on the international community to take the initiative and support inclusive political negotiations, as all sides to the conflict had a stake in such talks and had to make concessions in the interest of Rwanda's future and regional stability. On the one hand, the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania were not viable in their present form. The "genocidaires" and other intimidators who were in the camps were fomenting violence and instability in the border areas with Rwanda. The continued existence of these camps would sow the seeds of future conflict in Rwanda.
On the other hand, the refugees should not be forced to return to Rwanda against their will. Moreover, resettling the refugees further inside the host countries was not a viable option either, because this would simply shift the source of instability. The lack of any viable political initiatives to resolve this dilemma was making UNHCR's job increasingly difficult. The only way out of this dilemma was to deal with the genocidaires. This was crucial because a vicious circle had to be broken: refugees were not returning because the Rwandan government was imprisoning suspected genocidaires; but the Rwandan government was taking this tough line because there was no action against genocidaires in the camps.
Addressing the situation would require a fundamentally different approach from the kind of refugee "solutions" normally advocated by UNHCR. In this respect, the current preoccupation of UNHCR with intimidators, rather than with the genocidaires, had diverted attention away from the real problem.
The intimidators in the camps were essentially lesser criminals, and their removal from the camps also raised questions of legality. It was important to realize, though, that it was not in UNHCR's mandate to apprehend the genocidaires. A comprehensive, region-wide solution, such as the Comprehensive Plan of Action CPA for Southeast Asia, needed to be adopted to resolve these problems. UNHCR had to build alliances with other actors, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and various NGOs, in an effort to bring to justice the perpetrators of genocide on both sides of the border.
UNHCR should not try to reduce services in the camps in an effort to persuade the refugees to go home. Community services, in particular, could prove very useful in helping the refugees to take decisions as a group, which is the only way that they would agree to return. Recent moves by Rwanda's government towards conciliatory processes of justice were a welcome sign of hope for creating such a comprehensive approach.
The Rwandan parliament was considering a tiered system of sentencing whereby persons who had murdered fewer than fifty people would receive a reduced sentence ranging from seven to twelve years, which was a huge concession in an effort to address the problem.
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A significant amount of international funding should be allocated to training of judges to try the genocidaires and to strengthening the processes that were being undertaken in order to fashion a lasting, comprehensive solution to the problems in Rwanda. Guest warned that UNHCR was allowing itself to be bullied by the military in Burundi, making further expulsions of refugees from Burundi almost inevitable. The discussion which followed demonstrated widespread agreement among conference participants on the importance of accountability for the perpetrators of Rwanda's genocide. Equally consensual was the point that the repatriation of refugees needed to be slowed while the peacebuilding, reconciliation and reconstruction processes were attended to.
Speakers diverged on the relative importance of the constituent elements of these processes - partly because of different characterizations of the root causes of the conflict. Notwithstanding differences in the prioritization of tasks and the degree of appropriate international involvement, most speakers agreed that the international community should play a decisive role by supporting Rwanda's efforts to heal the wounds which both spurred the conflict and were created by it.
Discussion first centered on the root causes of the conflict in Rwanda. A UN field representative pointed out that the to period  needed to be viewed in light of Rwanda's colonial history and policies of divide-and-rule through ethnic differentiation. The explosive period of ethnic differentiation which culminated in was directly linked to a change in colonial influence and a complete turnover in local administrative power. Ambassador Kayinamura of Rwanda agreed. The violence which accompanied the process of decolonization along with the policies of political exclusion on ethnic grounds adopted by the first post-colonial leadership in Rwanda were major precursors to the recent genocide.
Then also, many Rwandans had fled and sought refuge in neighboring countries. Cycles of exclusion and return and of impunity and fear could in fact be found throughout Rwanda's post-colonial history and represented a primary cause of instability, many discussants argued. The tendency toward impunity for the perpetrators of genocide continued to date and was thought by some participants to be reinforced by references to the genocide as "past. Only then could a process of "healing the wounds" begin.
To restore accountability and start the necessary process of reconciliation, several participants suggested that a truth commission would be a useful complement to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. A truth commission could give a legitimate venue for testimony and fact-gathering.
Rehn disagreed, explaining that witnesses were often unwilling to testify before parallel truth commissions for fear of incriminating themselves in the Tribunal. Another senior UN official also opposed the proposal for a truth commission. He appealed for patience with the Tribunal, explaining that the process was slow because the Justices had to begin by legislating their own procedures. Speaking to participants' frustration with Rwanda's internal justice system, he insisted that not even a country with a fully staffed and well-functioning judiciary could handle the massive tasks which the situation in Rwanda presented.
Most participants placed bringing the perpetrators of genocide to justice ahead of refugee return on the list of priorities for Rwanda. In addition, some participants agreed that the pace of refugee return from host countries bordering Rwanda should be orderly. One participant especially highlighted the potentially violent and serious repercussions which a mass stampede of returning refugees could have.
The refugees represented a ticking time bomb for the region, and the situation therefore required patience and skill in seeking solutions. Another participant questioned this position, however, arguing that repatriation was a precondition for effective reconciliation in Rwanda. On the proposal to move the camps in Zaire away from the border and the Masisi region, where upsurges in violence were linked to the presence of the refugees, there was general agreement that this plan involved serious risks.
Some conditioned their support for the proposal on a concerted effort to sort out the perpetrators of the genocide from the other refugees in the camps. Others urged the initiation of grassroots negotiations with the local Zairian communities who would host the relocated refugees and programs to mitigate their negative impacts. These included unemployment, the creation of a dollar-based economy, and environmental devastation which had to be addressed in any plan to move the refugees further inland.
Minister Pronk, however, warned that the current level of funds did not allow for such development programs. Collins, Consultant on African Programs for the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, also pointed to the tensions raised by the large amounts of humanitarian assistance for the refugees arriving in countries like Zaire, while the local population faced inadequate resources to meet their needs - ironically because their country did not explode into war.
Hasegawa, Resident Coordinator of the UN Operational Systems in Rwanda, strongly questioned why the Rwandans inside and outside of the country were constantly referred to as two "sides" or "camps" in the conflict. He argued that this terminology implied an equality between the victims and the perpetrators of the genocide. Such an equality was intolerable, suggested Dr. Schoettle, in the face of a genocide which was so carefully planned. Support for the international tribunal, as well as an injection of resources into the local justice system, were imperative.
While agreeing with these calls for further support, Ms. Rehn sounded a note of warning, suggesting that international interest in Rwanda had almost disappeared. General Eisele also regretted that the international community was often eager to get involved when internal conflicts arose over oil or access to water, but not in cases like Rwanda, where ethnicity was more salient than strategic resources. Most participants agreed that the international community had made errors in judgment during and immediately after the conflict.
Still, there was some disagreement about the path for Rwanda's future. Ambassador Kayinamura asserted that home-grown solutions to the problems of the region should be given priority. Rwanda needed to solve its own problems, which could not be separated from those of the region. Its post-genocide government was one of national unity; there were five non-sectarian political parties included in the government, and eight parties in the parliament. The only party which was not represented was that of the perpetrators of the genocide. The new government took another conciliatory step by bringing 5, former soldiers back from Zaire and reintegrating them into a national army.
All of this, Ambassador Kayinamura explained, was achieved despite the fact that the new government had inherited a bankrupt economy and had lost its professionals, tradespeople, police forces and judiciary to the carnage and refugee flight. It was difficult for those outside the country to understand the extremely sensitive moral, legal, and political issues which Rwandans now faced in rebuilding their country.
Whether inside Rwanda or in neighboring countries affected by the presence of refugees, the developmental tasks were significant. International involvement had the potential to help in terms of long-term assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Ambassador Nsanze of Burundi called on the international community to stop ignoring, in particular, the continued widespread flow of arms to the region.
Perpetuating a Distorted Vision?
Addressing this factor alone could help prevent a recurrence of genocide in the region, he argued. A senior official from the United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF noted that the international community had yet to learn that it must look at the particularities of the country and especially the lives of ordinary people when giving reconstruction aid. Rwanda's people needed an improved local and civil society in order to bolster peace, security, and reconstruction development. He also cautioned against the use of terms which indicated that it was possible for Rwandans to return to a situation that existed before.
Terms such as " re construction," " re patriation," and " re conciliation" all indicated that there had been development and peaceful coexistence prior to the recent fighting. This was not the case for Rwanda, where the situation had been untenable for some time before the conflict, as was now recognized. Rwanda faced overpopulation, a shaky economic system, and a growing number of youth without adequate education or economic opportunity. Most participants argued for a comprehensive approach to the physical reconstruction of Rwanda.
While there was disagreement as to whether the return of refugees should come before or after reconciliation, and whether justice efforts should precede or be established parallel to reconstruction as emergency assistance evolved into development aid, most agreed that nothing would move forward without coordinated international political and financial assistance on both sides of the border and throughout the affected region. Rosenblatt proposed that the international community appoint a single person with great stature to promote political negotiations and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region.
He argued that the series of envoys sent to the region were only confusing the issue, although others countered that each envoy had been hand-picked to carry out a defined task and that entrusting such a diversity of tasks to a single individual would prove impossible.
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A UN field representative also noted the widespread mistrust of Rwanda's authorities among donor governments, which he felt was unwarranted. He challenged the international community to listen actively to Rwandans' own characterizations of their needs and to integrate international efforts with the country's internal processes of rebuilding. Ambassador Kayinamura noted that this perceived mistrust was not there, as the international community had worked with the Rwandan government to organize two Roundtables for Rwanda with the donor community.
Following Ambassador Huaraka's introduction, Ms. MacDonald examined the complexity and magnitude of reconstruction in the context of today's protracted civil wars. She emphasized the need for a well-integrated, "holistic" approach that was sensitive to the uniqueness of specific post-war settings. Ambassador Moore focused on three elements on which the efficacy of international reconstruction efforts particularly hinged: coordination, resource-mobilization, and donor commitment.
Finally, Mr. Malloch Brown suggested strategies that international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, might pursue in post-war settings, noting that the World Bank's primary mission in today's world of failed and vulnerable states was to help societies "normalize" and adapt to dramatically changing conditions.
Ambassador Huaraka opened the panel with an appeal for urgent attention to reconstruction to support the longer-term goal of reconciling enemy brothers and sisters. People who had gone from living peaceably to warring fiercely had a long, complex process ahead to heal the wounds of enmity. Reconstruction had a critical role to play in helping them rebuild a "house" in which they could once again live as family.
Reconstructing a war-torn society was a multidimensional task that went beyond purely physical and economic rebuilding, Ms. MacDonald began. For reconstruction to be successful, it had to be part of an overall strategy that integrated all four elements being considered at this conference: reconstruction, reconciliation, demilitarization, and effective multilateral engagement. It had to embrace reconstruction of governing institutions at community, local and national levels; expansion of economic opportunities; inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups; restoration of environmental balance; and rebuilding of spiritual and cultural values.
The international community knew far too little about the complexity of reconstruction, and research to date was insufficient. Some construction efforts appeared to have worked, others not, and it was not always clear why. As a result, the international community's current efforts involved groping for solutions and engaging in large-scale experimentation.
MacDonald attributed to three factors: first, the strength of shared social norms; second, the willingness of donors to invest enormous resources; third, and less often recognized, early planning, which began even while the war still raged. As early as , teams had begun to devise the framework of what became the Marshall Plan. Similarly, early development of the Beveridge Plan allowed the United Kingdom to introduce a health service immediately after the war. Early planning therefore needed to be embed-ded in today's peace processes, incorporating the parties to conflict along with civil society.
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Unauthorized third parties may access data and communications, including email, when communicated via the Internet. Personalisation means addressing the needs and aspirations of whole communities to ensure everyone has access to the right information, advice and advocacy to make good decisions about the support they need. It means ensuring that people have wider choice in how their needs are met and are able to access universal services such as transport, leisure and education, housing, health and opportunities for employment, regardless of age or disability.
Social workers have a central role in developing and delivering personalised social care and support services. Social work is focused on supporting independence, and promoting choice and control, for people facing difficulties due to disability, mental health issues, effects of age and other circumstances. Its distinct contribution is to make sure that services are personalised and that human rights are safeguarded through:.
View the full video. In adult services, social workers are essential to the delivery of personalised services and to achieving better outcomes with adults of all ages who need services, support or protection.
Social work has an important role in supporting people facing life-changing circumstances and working with people whose rights may be undermined through abuse and neglect. Social workers in multi-disciplinary teams contribute a holistic view with a perspective of the whole person, rather than a focus only on their symptoms or circumstances, and are therefore in a good position to support better person-centred outcomes.
Personalisation originates at least in part from social work values. Good social work practice has always involved putting the person first and promoting independent living; values such as respect for the individual and self-determination have long been at the heart of social work. In this sense the underlying values of personalisation are familiar. It is quite fascinating for me that we are now going back to things that I believe were happening a number of years ago and I am rediscovering skills that I had forgotten. Social work and its values can potentially shape the responses to personalisation of the entire health and social care workforce.
Listening, empowering individuals, recognising and addressing potential conflict, safeguarding needs and the capacity of individuals, being sensitive to diversity and putting people in control should be central to the way staff and services treat people from the first point of contact. Social workers could have a leadership role here, particularly in the advanced professional role envisaged in the career structure proposed by the Social Work Task Force.
Social Work Task Force At one point social work was all about keeping people safe and now it is keeping people safe while enabling them to lead a life that they always wanted to lead. Social work skills will continue to be important to assessment, support planning and review. Critical reflection and relationship-based working will ensure that individuals can identify and achieve their chosen outcomes.
As personalisation progresses, social workers may find themselves doing more direct social work, drawing on therapeutic skills as well as skills in community development. In Hartlepool the current care arrangements are being radically transformed into a model of self-directed support.
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I feel safe in doing this as the social worker bit lets me really communicate with the person rather than following scripted forms that can get in the way. Many of the support plans now are outcome- rather than process-focused and this is a real change from the earlier support plans which often resembled traditional care plans. Joe has autism, with no speech and is profoundly deaf.