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Olav Bjerkholt - Department of Economics
Old Password. New Password. Many Bank staff members helped patiently with my search for materials and documents. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the European Union, whose additional finance made the project possible. After the committee held a two-day meeting in Washington to review the manuscript, I received 62 pages of written comments.
These were supportive, tough and searching, and precipitated some energetic rewriting on my part. One member, Jose Antonio Ocampo, had difficulty participating owing to the singularly good excuse that he was made Colombia's Minister of Finance shortly after the project began. I owe him a special debt of gratitude for reading my draft immediately after leaving office and making extensive and exceptionally useful comments.
Special thanks go as well to Alan Knight, who in addition to making extensive comments on substance also drove me relentlessly to rewrite the text in clear and nontechnical English, and to Osvaldo Sunkel and Albert Fishlow, who read and commented on the entire manuscript a second time. In Oxford, Pablo Astorga worked with me throughout the year as research fellow, and has contributed significantly to the book. He and Valpy Fitzgerald were responsible for much of the quantitative work, which as revealed in the Statistical Appendix was a tour de force that we hope may result in a separate publication.
Leila Jazayery worked tirelessly as a research assistant. My colleagues, both in the Latin American Centre and in Queen. Elizabeth House, took over all my usual jobs with exceptional good grace, and Alan Knight, Alan Angell, Malcolm Deas and Valpy Fitzgerald struggled with my first draft and improved it enormously. Laurence Whitehead also provided insights, material and commentary. Antony's College provided financial management.
My thanks also go to the consultants, who were all extraordinarily generous with their ideas and insights. People told me to "take their text and use it as I wished. I keep the really special thanks to the last. I could not possibly have managed without the unreserved commitment of the Latin American Centre's office in Oxford. Margaret Hancox is an outstanding administrator, and a continual source of moral support. And, of course, I could not have managed without Tim, my husband, who kept me calm, offered encouragement, tolerated my obsession and sorted my computer problems.
For the world, it was a century that perhaps saw as much change and tumult as any in the history of mankind. Rosemary Thorp writes of Latin America's century, but notes in her introduction of how difficult it is to capture a period whose hue is shaded by so many "lights and shadows. Today's conventional wisdom for Latin America heralds export-led economies fueled by technical innovation, but in , the same idea was in vogue. The social cost of excluding poor and marginalized people is singled out as a crucial issue today, while only two generations ago exclusion was so thoroughly woven into the fabric of Latin America that it was simply accepted.
The focus now is on the shortcomings of import substitution industrialization, in the process seemingly wanting to forget it was once reasonably considered to be the pillar of progress upon which a modern Latin America would be built.
The author relentlessly poses the question: What did the Latin American economies achieve in the course of a hundred years? The closest we can come to answers is that per capita income increased fivefold, yet today it is lower in proportion to the industrial countries than it was a century ago; modern infrastructure was built and industry grew to 25 percent of GDP, but the region's share of world trade was halved; social indicators such as life expectancy and literacy improved dramatically, but inequity and poverty worsened.
This analysis of the experience of the 20th century can be immensely instructive for those building for the future. For this reason, the Inter-American Develop-. The Bank was created in in response to a longstanding desire on the part of the Latin American nations for a development institution that would focus on the pressing problems of the region. Today it is the world's largest regional development bank and the leading source of multilateral credit for Latin America and the Caribbean. The Bank finances projects that address practically every social and economic issue discussed in this book.
The European Union and Latin America have longstanding historical and cultural ties, and since the s have steadily improved their political relations. A formal regional and subregional political dialogue was established through such efforts as the Groups of Rio and San Jose, and there have been numerous interparliamentary meetings and extensive cooperation agreements. The European Union is also Latin America's largest source of public development aid, and since its support has been complemented by lending to the region by the European Investment Bank. Only history can provide the perspective that shapes vision—in the Latin American case, clearly a vision that can reconcile growth with equity along the twin paths of increased productivity and participation.
The gains and setbacks of the century are guideposts to help shape that vision, and for determining the best path for the development of Latin America and the Caribbean in the years ahead. It asks the basic question: What did the Latin American economies achieve in the course of a hundred years, and how did those achievements come about?
For the continent certainly changed. In , there were some 70 million Latin Americans; by the year , there will be million. Three-quarters of the population lived in the countryside when the century began; today, two in three live in cities.
In , three-quarters were illiterate; at the century's end, seven of eight adults can read and write. Life changed dramatically for ordinary people in four generations. The economy also grew. In the year , the continental per capita income will be five times higher than in Figure 1. Yet, while Latin America progressed economically, it failed to gain ground on the developed world. Average per capita income of the larger Latin American economies was 14 percent that of the United States in and 13 percent in the s. Income relative to Northern Europe rose by mid-century, only to decline again.
Using data from Maddison , Latin American GDP was around 16 percent of that of the average of France, Germany and Britain at the turn of the century, and rose to 23 percent by mid-century. Positions were reversed in the second half of the century. Financial dependence grew as foreign debt increased and Latin America remained vulnerable to external shocks. Life expectancy increased from 40 to 70 years, and literacy rates rose from 30 to 85 percent of adults.
However, income distribution almost certainly worsened: it was probably the worst in the world by the s, and deteriorated even further as. Today, two in every five Latin American families rank as poor. Behind the aggregate growth performance lay a transformation of the basic economic structures of the Latin American countries.
Not even the smallest country in could have been considered an integrated nation. In every country, remote regional economies and societies had little interaction with the rest of the economy, and links, if there were any, might well have run outward. In Mexico, the Yucatan peninsula had no rail connection with the rest of the country and traded principally with the United States.
Southern Brazil exported hides, skins and jerked beef but sold almost none to the rest of the country. Sugar and cotton economies in the Brazilian Northeast and the rubber economy in the Amazon formed similar islands. Bolivian currency circulated in the south of Peru and Guatemalan pesos in the south of Mexico.
In some villages, trade was still based on barter: maize, beans, dried chili and tortillas were common means of exchange in parts of rural Mexico. At the turn of the century, Haber reckons, some two-thirds of the Mexican population remained outside the consumer economy. See Knight in Companion Volume 1. He vividly describes the lack of regional integration during the period. See Abreu in Companion Volume 1. Estimating the amount of production that was subsistence is virtually impossible, since estimates of production were made from the area planted or sown, thus automatically incorporating, at least in principle, subsistence farming.
Factory production had begun in Chile and Peru in the s. But nowhere did the share of manufacturing in GDP exceed 10 percent, and industry produced only for the national market. By mid-century, a revolution in infrastructure and national integration had occurred. Transport costs fell nationally and internationally between and and the change was only beginning. By the end of the century, a further revolution had occurred, with air travel and transport, telex, fax and the internet further easing communication and movement.
Implicit in the economic history of this century is a story of institutional transformation. By institutions we mean both the usual organizations, such as the judiciary, central banks, planning ministries and firms, as well as the rules of the game such as property rights, and even social customs, all of which are an important part of the fabric that conditions behavior and response of economic agents. The s were a decade of substantial institutional innovation, with central banks becoming almost universal for the first time, and customs and tax collection agencies taking new shape.
From the s to the s, the principal institutional growth was in public enterprises, development banks, industrial development institutions, and agricultural development agencies promoting technology and credit. With the shift in the development model in the s and s away from state intervention and towards free markets, Latin America entered a phase during which many organizations were abolished, downgraded or privatized.
Establishing or strengthening other types of institutions, such as stable rules of the game and regulatory bodies, assumed pivotal importance. Within this process of overall growth, the continent experienced a clear pattern of waves of expansion that responded to the growth phases of the world economy. The first phase of expansion was already well under way at the start of the century, its starting date anywhere after depending on the country in question.
In a few cases, internal disorder was such that the expansion only really began with the new century. The second phase began with the renewed expansion of the world economy after the disruptions of the two World Wars and the Great Depression. While world expansion was important to this wave of growth, the principal focus in Latin America was inward looking.
In many countries, expansion was for the first time faster than the growth of the purchasing power of exports Figure 1. Each phase. Source: Statistical Appendix. Note: The purchasingf power of exports is derived by deflating each country's export values by a price index for their imports. The countries included are. When external conditions abruptly became less favorable, problems of debt were added to continuing problems of dependence on foreign markets.
Each phase gave way to a period first of recession,. Following the first expansion, these phases lasted, for some countries, from to the s. The second recession began with the debt crisis of , and the ensuing transition is still in process as the century ends. The first wave of expansion was essentially a period of primary export-led growth. But labor was scarce, a problem only partially remedied by immigration. This scarcity led perversely not to a good income distribution with high returns to labor, but rather to institutions that repressed and controlled labor and created a labor supply by dispossessing peasants.
Indian communities in particular were often dispossessed and evicted, while various forms of forced labor helped to secure a cheap supply of workers. These developments simply extended the colonial inheritance of land concentration and the subjugation of Indian peoples. Inequality was thus knit deeply into the fabric of the model and was part of its effectiveness in generating growth. Each national story of export expansion had different consequences for vested interests, for policymaking, and for the links between the two.
The result was that the ability of policymakers to manage change varied, but, as we shall see, was always embedded in unequal structures. When expansion ended with the Great Depression of , the fact that the motor of growth was damaged did nothing to change social and political structures.
As the transition period melded slowly into the new pattern of expansion, significant institutional change occurred, but not in patterns of ownership. There was growth of a middle class and even of indigenous social movements, but the traditional elite groups remained extremely powerful. The institutional change involved expansion and redirection of the role of the state in promoting growth. But governments and private sectors were in large measure responding to the existing socioeconomic structure, so the significant gains in building institutions did little to ameliorate the inequality embedded in the status quo.
In the previous expansion phase, export-led growth had actually shaped and cemented the structure of income distribution and the institutions delivering it.
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Inequality was functional to the efficiency of the growth path. In this second phase, the distribution of resources was a given from the start and not radically modified. Major institutional development occurred, but was directed principally at enlarging and focus-. In most countries, this expansion was funded by indirect taxation, exchange rate manipulation, profits of state enterprises, and borrowing, and did not involve any direct confrontation with traditional power groups such as increasing direct taxes.
Thus the deep entrenchment of sociopolitical structures in an unequal system persisted through the first shift in the development model. In fact, the new patterns actually reinforced the existing distribution of income, since the expanding economic activities were capital-intensive, employment creation was slower than the growth of demand for jobs, and the structure of production catered to existing demand, producing consumer durables for upper- and middle-class urban residents. Income concentration was not optimal for the dynamics of the new industrialization model, since it would have been desirable to have a wider national market, more broadly-based domestic savings, more flexible policymaking, and more investment in human resources.
However, the existing power structure, vested interests, and the short-term economic costs of change all militated against a decisive policy of redistribution. Efforts tended to fall short for both political and economic reasons, as with land reform, which was at once technically difficult and opposed by vested interests. Technical failures further strengthened support for the status quo. The period of transition of Latin America's next expansionary phase is still in progress as the end of the century approaches.
Once again, crisis has brought a new policy approach, a change more abrupt and ideological than in the first transition. Once again, the new approach is embedded in the existing structure, exacerbating inequality by worsening income distribution, a clear empirical finding for the s. However, in the s, policy is perceptibly shifting, becoming more pragmatic and diverse. Social issues appear to be moving up the agenda in a number of countries. These developments frame the questions and challenges at the end of the century. Are any of the disadvantages that lack of equity brought to the postwar model still relevant today?
The rise and fall of socialism
How far is inequality in fact functional to the new approach? Can growth-friendly policies be made compatible with social equity? This book considers the dramatic transformation in output and in institutions over the century, and the equally dramatic record of inequity and poverty. The analytical approach we use combines quantitative data with what is known as "political economy," a shorthand for the interface between political forces, institutional inheritance and economic outcomes. Political economy studies how economic policies and their results emerge from a particular balance of political forces, are executed with varying degrees of efficiency in the interests of a distinct group or several groups, and are refined by mechanisms of consultation or accountability.
For a "political" economist, it is significant that outcomes vary greatly in both growth and equity terms depending on political and institutional factors. Chronological analysis of the century begins in Chapters Three and Four with the period from to This is preceded by a preliminary scene-setting in Chapter Two, which tries to quantify progress and poverty for the century.
It also begins to elucidate exclusion by exploring important interactions between such factors as gender, literacy, poverty and the environment. Chapters Three and Four overlap chronologically; the first explores the nature of export-led growth across the continent up to By comparing experiences in different countries, the chapter seeks an explanation for the very different experiences of growth, institution building, development of policymaking capacity, concentration of income and wealth, and environmental damage. Explanations are found in a wide range of factors, but they point in particular to the nature of the export commodity, relations with international capital and markets, and preexisting conditions.
For example, it made a difference for equity whether or not there was an indigenous population that had to be displaced or dispossessed for export expansion to occur. Chapter Four examines the impact of external shocks between and wars and depression-and seeks patterns in the responses of countries to the threats and opportunities represented by such shocks. The next period, to , is considered in Chapters Five and Six. This period saw significant growth of the role and functions of the state and an associated development of institutions.
The larger countries industrialized significantly, the smaller countries less so, aided in some cases by economic integration. Agriculture and primary exports were widely neglected and income distribution generally wors-. Inflation became a widespread problem among the larger economies. Again, national capacities for managing the process and adjusting are examined, as the pitfalls of excess protection of industry and discrimination against exports and agriculture became more visible.
The final period begins with the quadrupling of the price of oil in The analysis traces the impact of a sudden increase in external funds and of no less sudden a withdrawal after We follow the evolution through years of mismanaged adjustment to the shock of the debt crisis, and then to the major shift in model in the s, which it is to be hoped will slowly evolve into a new period of growth— and possibly even greater concerns with equity—by the end of the century. The final chapter reflects on what the analysis of the century teaches us and attempts to draw it together, even though the story itself suggests the impossibility of writing a book about "Latin America" per se.
We are dealing with countries radically different in size, both of territory and population, ranging from Brazil, today with million people, to the smallest states of the Caribbean. The ethnic composition of the countries varies as well: compare Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Guatemala, with their large indigenous populations, to Argentina, 30 percent of whose population was foreign in , largely European in origin. Even ivithin countries, the differences are so great, and the lack of integration at least for the first 40 years so marked, that some writers speak of national economies as archipelagos of distinct regions and localities.
There remains an irresistible temptation to draw out common threads and seek systematic explanations of different outcomes. But the objective here is to include as much comparative analysis among countries and as much micro detail as the text can bear—perhaps more than it can bear, but that seemed the better direction in which to fall off the tightrope. The "Companion Volumes" described in the preface are a second part of the strategy and, to continue the metaphor, provide an important safety net.
From an economist's perspective, the driving forces of growth are the accumulation of capital and the technical change embodied in it. Behind this process lie three principal classes of economic actors, each with its distinct way of working. First are the small or medium-sized local enterprises, known as SMEs, typically family-owned. These entrepreneurs often have an ambiguous attitude toward growth, since a larger firm brings the threat of loss of family control. Second are public sector enterprises, their distinctive characteristics being a lack of budget constraints, and vulnerability to pressures to view providing employment as a goal in itself.
Third are the large, profit-oriented firms, ranging from multinationals based in developed countries, and their Latin American versions all referred to here as transnationals, or TNCs , to domestic groups that shade down to the SME end of the scale. At the start of the century, the SMEs dominated. Public enterprises were almost nonexistent and TNCs few in number, though they often accounted for much if not all export production. Since political economy is the analytical tool being used to examine the century's economic development, the range of actors must be extended to include business groups, civil society organizations such as unions, popular groupings such as women's organizations and peasant associations, political parties, nongovernmental organizations NGOs , and the state itself, which comprises the civil service bureaucracy, the government in power at the time, and public enterprises.
Government itself is never a single actor, but comprises the central executive, the ministries, and local governments, in addition to public enterprises, each with its own agenda and varying levels of competence. The military has also been an important actor. In the s and s, its influence was seen both within government and without, building up industry and influencing its structure see Chapter Five.
In the s and more so in the s, the military often attempted to impose economic as well as political order. By the s, they had returned to barracks. Finally, there are external actors: foreign governments, international financial institutions increasingly after the s , and an important homegrown international organization in the shape of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. The nonspecialist reader may reasonably ask where ordinary people might.
They are indeed the heart of the story, but it is impossible to tell this kind of history through individual cases. A few brief histories have been included in order to give a sense of what lies behind the statistical categories with which we have to work. The most obvious impact of growth on the quality of life concerns the distribution of the benefits of that growth. But other aspects also affect quality, such as the security and sustainability of the growth process, particularly in terms of the stability of income and prices. Both can affect the gains from growth and its viability.
Instability can be linked to vulnerability to external shocks emanating from an unstable world economy: we need to explore the ways in which growth might have become more or less resilient to such shocks. Lastly, environmental costs and benefits, perhaps affect the quality of growth, though there are few data to explore how far such costs have in fact undermined the viability of the growth path. This chapter first documents growth itself in terms of output, productivity and infrastructure.
It then examines the four elements that help determine the quality of growth: stability of growth, stability of prices, economic dimensions of external dependence, and environmental costs. We then attempt to explore social welfare, first via poverty and income distribution, which requires analysis of demographic. Finally, the chapter examines literacy and life expectancy, concluding with an attempt to build a Historical Living Standards Index for the century. Most of the data has been consigned to the Statistical Appendix, in the interest of readability.
The initial rapid growth of the early century, based on primary exports and capital inflow, gave way to somewhat slower growth starting with the First World War, followed by the fastest period of growth between and , then by a decline Table 2. Most countries for which we have data experienced their most rapid growth in the post-WWII period, except for Argentina, Chile, Cuba and, probably, Uruguay, all of which had faster growth in their initial export economy phase.
Exports fueled growth in the early period, with one remarkable exception: from , Brazil grew faster than her export sector Appendix Table VI. Chapter Four explores how all but the smallest countries were forced into a change of direction by the shocks of the first half of the century.
After , the rate of. The data collection comes primarily from original work for this project by Pablo Astorga and Valpy Fitzgerald economic growth, productivity and vulnerability , Andre Hofman GDP and investment , Oscar Altimir income distribution and Shane and Barbara Hunt life expectancy and literacy. Comparison between the period from , for which we have 13 countries, and , for which we have data for 19, suggests that the eight are a reasonable proxy for total GDP growth, with the per capita figure being slightly exaggerated, as the new entrants tend to have higher population growth rates.
Cuba becomes difficult to incorporate in the comparative analysis after With the revolution, the country adopted the Communist system of material balances for its accounting of growth, which excludes all services and commerce. The Caribbean cannot be incorporated in any full way in the early part of the century, for lack of data. Note: LA-8 is comprised of the countries listed above. Source: Statistical Appendix II. What lay behind this fact is explored in Chapter Five. The same sense of cyclical growth and similar timing is seen in the "productivity" per capita of the economically active population.
This was followed typically by a period of more unstable and rather slow growth, then a change of trend, particularly in industrial productivity, sometime in the s or s. Sustained increases in productivity then continued in a rather stable way until the s. These periods are summa-. This is value added per worker recorded for census purposes as belonging to the sector, whether employed or not.
So it is hardly productivity in the usual sense see Statistical Appendix. These data are presented and analyzed much more fully in a forthcoming paper by those responsible for building the series for this book, Pablo Astorga and Valpy Fitzgerald. The end of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century saw a wave of investment in railways Table 2.
This surge was based on substantial external financing. At the same time, there was expansion of ports and development of financial infrastructure in the form of private banks. In the early period, three countries led the process—Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba—with Chile and Mexico close behind. Brazil's indicators were of course affected by the enormous extension of the country: its relatively low ranking underestimates the level of development of certain regions in Brazil.
In terms of social infrastructure in the form of social welfare networks, the five pioneers in the s and s were Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, Chile and Brazil, with social security programs including pensions and sickness benefits. The Statistical Appendix gives the data on which this is based, and also the standard deviations of the growth rates, as an indicator of the degree of stability. For example, 11 countries had industrial accident insurance by the s. Mesa-Lago, Note: Measurements are based on kilometers for length of railway track, kilowatts per hour for output of electric energy, and number in use for telephones and motor vehicles.
Motor vehicles are given as a poor proxy for roads, which no doubt failed to expand proportionately. Source: Statistical Appendix X. The post-World War II period saw strong growth of infrastructure decade by decade. Brazil and Venezuela moved up the ranking, and generally the gap between countries closed somewhat. The recent consensus, although there is debate over this, is that greater instability in Latin America has adversely affected investor confidence and thus investment.
See Appendix X to appraise levels of infrastructure by country. Inter-American Development Bank, This is an important finding for the analysis of the later period. A farther aspect of instability is more obvious: prices. Inflation can slow growth by aggravating uncertainty and reducing savings unless indexation is more or less complete, as in Brazil from the s to the s.
The account in Chapter Five of the Argentine immigrant entrepreneur, Samuel, demonstrates how credit systems and small businesses can be undermined Box 5. Inflation can prompt repeated efforts at stabilization, which in the s and s damaged growth and often failed to cure inflation. Price rises may also hit the poor more than the rich, since the poor have fewer ways of defending themselves. The record on inflation Appendix Table V. By the mids, even Brazil's high rate had come down. External shocks can also cause economic instability, and exposure to such shocks may increase or decrease with time.
If an economy grows but in so doing increases, say, its dependence on imported foodstuffs, its export concentration on a few products and markets, and its level of debt, it seems important at least to note these facts. We have constructed a data set to look at these aspects of external dependence over the long run. The preliminary results, summarized in Appendix VII, suggest that over the century the major countries did reduce their degree of exposure in a number of areas. In particular, commodity concentration of exports became far less pronounced by the s and s, geographical concentration of exports and imports was reduced, and the dependence of fiscal revenue on the level of trade fell noticeably from mid-century.
Dependence on oil imports varied greatly. Between countries, it was a function of local production possibilities, and for any given country, it was also a result of the instability of the price of oil. Dependence on food imports fell somewhat, though some highly dependent countries remained so. Financial exposure increased in the s and s, with increased debt, greater vulnerability to interest rate changes and a higher propensity to move.
And the increased diversity of trade, while on the whole positive, in part represented a new dependence on fragile intraregional trade, which tended to transmit the effects of recession between neighbors. What happened in the smaller countries, however, was a more unhappy tale. The Caribbean forms the extreme case. Here, trade measures of openness remained extraordinarily high.
For example, in 19 of the 26 states on the widest definition of the Caribbean , the ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP in the s was over percent, and often far over. The larger countries—the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago—still had ratios of around 50 to 70 percent.
These three aspects of the quality of growth—instability of growth itself and of prices, and external vulnerability—can interact in any number of ways to make the development path less secure. We shall try to tease out the interrelations and the consequences as we narrate our story period by period. The fourth and final qualification to the gains from growth occurs when they are associated with environmental destruction, to the point of endangering long-run growth.
Obviously, resource consumption is a necessary part of progress. Defining what is "too much" involves weighing both present competing interests and the interests of future generations. Measuring the latter is often complicated, since it implies quantifying imponderables such as which resources will be most in demand in the future.
Just as for other parts of the world, lack of concern historically means that there is little information from which to calculate the environmental costs of growth for Latin America. Contemporary data suggest the cost has clearly been high, but there is no way to determine exactly when and where those costs were incurred, nor to match one country or one product against another. Sensitivity to these 9. Latin America in the 19th century was marked by incipient environmental interest, mostly that of "amateur enthusiasts in natural sciences," while by the s and s some enhanced perception of new environmental problems worked toward the adoption of legislation and the creation of forest agencies, notably in Mexico and Brazil.
Only by the s was there a hesitant acceptance of environmental concerns. Subsequent chapters try to introduce the more qualitative evidence where it exists; here we would make six points in summary of the continent's historical experience. First, the rapid expansion of most crops in Latin America was associated with some degree of resource abuse, leading to deforestation, erosion, and, where irrigation was practiced, salinity. In Mexico, 79 percent of arable land is eroded, 28 percent severely so, and 16 percent denuded. In the Andes, erosion affects 30 to 80 percent of arable land, depending on the region.
An example was banana expansion in Central America, which illustrates the two severe problems of monoculture: disease and pollution, the former caused by repeated use of land for one crop, the latter often resulting from the methods used to treat disease and falling soil fertility.
Third, the deficiencies or absence of institutions constrained implementation of progressive policies. For example, a code to induce replanting of trees was introduced surprisingly early in Brazil, but was ignored. The first reforestation program In , the Vargas government set up a forest code, denying absolute rights of property, prohibiting the cutting of trees along water courses or those harboring rare species or protecting watersheds, and forbidding owners to cut more than three-quarters of the trees on their property.
The code was unsuccessful both because it was not enforced and because of the many problems in the way it was designed. There were easy ways to evade the law. Implementation required that each county set up a forest delegation for enforcement, but few were established. The problems have typically been those of contamination, such as arsenic in the water supplies of the area surrounding Southern Peru Copper Corporation in Ilo in the s, or contamination of land by smelter fumes around Cerro de Pasco in Central Peru in the s and s.
For the sheer quantity of pollutants released into the air and water, the mining sector has been the most important source of industrial pollution. From the end of the s, industrial production followed the developed country trend toward capital-intensity and energy oil intensity, while the mechanization of agriculture took agribusiness in the same direction. The most dynamic industries were characterized by high degrees of toxicity, releasing mercury, lead, manganese, chromium, cadmium and even radioactive materials, all elements which directly destroy the organic compounds of the environment.
In consequence, pollution problems have been severe for those living in large cities. Academic Interests History of Norwegian economic thought, Ragnar Frisch's scientific contributions, Trygve Haavelmo's scientific contributions. Olav Bjerkholt and Duo Qin eds. Olav Bjerkholt and A. Dupont: Problems and Methods of Econometrics. On the founding of the econometric society. Journal of the History of Economic Thought. How it all began: the first Econometric Society meeting, Lausanne, September European Journal of the History of Economic Thought.
Econometric Theory. Ragnar Frisch and interior-point methods. Optimization Letters. Lawrence Klein i Oslo. Lawrence R. Klein Notes on the early years. Journal of Policy Modeling. Trygve Haavelmo at the Cowles Commission. Promoting Econometrics through Econometrica Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
Gyldendal Akademisk. Ragnar Frisch and the Probability Approach. History of Political Economy. Ragnar Frisch's Conception of Econometrics. Akademisk Publisering. Methods, Theory and Applications. World Scientific. Chapter 1. The making of the Leif Johansen multi-sectoral model. History of Economic Ideas. Fra brokar til bro. Trygve Haavelmo's visit in Aarhus Ragnar Frisch's business cycle approach: The genesis of the propagation and impulse model. Writing "the probability approach" with nowhere to go: Haavelmo in the United States, Rivista di Storia Economica.
Economic Systems Research. Frisch's econometric laboratory and the rise of Trygve Haavelmo's Probability Approach. Markets, models and planning: the Norwegian experience. Fudan University Press. Macmillan Publishers Ltd.. Papers and proceedings of the colloquium on the history of business-cycle analysis. European Communities. Springer, New York. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Interaction between model builders and policy makers in the Norwegian tradition.
Economic Modelling. Cambridge University Press. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. Ragnar Frisch, Editor of Econometrica When input-output analysis came to Norway. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. Oxford University Press. Problems and Methods of Econometrics. Rettferd og politikk. Emilia Press AS. Festskrift til Hilde Bojer. Frontier environmental issues. Kunnskapens krav.