However, most of these transition economies have faced severe short-term difficulties, and longer-term constraints on development. Many transition economies experienced rising unemployment as newly privatised firms tried to become more efficient. Under communism, state owned industries tended to employ more people than was strictly needed, and as private entrepreneurs entered the market, labour costs were cut back in an attempt to improve efficiency.
As the newly established private firms became subject to greater competition some were driven out of the market, which created job losses. In addition, a reduction in the size of the state bureaucracy also meant that many employees of the state also lost their jobs. Between and , unemployment rose in the three selected transition economies and was consistently above more well-established, market-based economies like the UK.
Of course, the global recession of - 92 accounts for some of the rising unemployment over that period. Market reforms adopted in these countries have gradually brought down unemployment in the transition economies, to be on a par with many established market economies.
Many transition economies also experienced price inflation as a result of the removal of price controls imposed by governments. When this happened, the newly privatised firms began to charge prices that reflected the true costs of production.
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In addition, some entrepreneurs exploited their position and raised prices in an attempt to profit from the situation. In order to understand the ways in which European populations might develop under different economic and social conditions, we discuss a set of four policy-related scenarios developed as part of a European-funded project called DEMIFER under the ESPON programme see the Acknowledgements and De Beer et al. We developed four alternative scenarios incorporating different bundles of policies Rees et al.
The motivation for developing alternative scenarios was twofold. First, the effects of policies depend on future economic developments. Therefore scenarios should reflect alternative future economic developments. We examined both a future characterized by sustainable growth and a future with low economic growth and worsening environmental problems. Second, policy-makers have a choice. They may emphasize social solidarity or they may stress economic competitiveness. Based on these motivations, the scenarios link policy bundles to demographic effects using two axes of policy variation: a Distribution-Fairness axis and an Economy—Environment axis.
At one end of the Economy—Environment dimension, we envisage a situation where sustainable growth has been achieved through technical and social innovation. At the other end of the Economy—Environment dimension, we envisage a situation where the environmental challenges have not been met and growth as traditionally measured has fallen. The Distribution-Fairness dimension varies from a bundle of policies designed to achieve social solidarity at one end, to a set of policies designed to improve the operation of markets and the achievement of greater competitiveness in a global market place at the other end.
Each of these scenarios is associated with a set of policies that we may expect to influence, to a greater or lesser degree, future patterns of mortality, fertility, and migration. The different scenarios thus assess the future impact of different developments in mortality, fertility, and migration on changes in population growth, particularly in the changes of the size of the working-age population, and on population ageing.
As the growth of the labor force does not just depend on the size of the working-age population but also on the level of labor force participation rates, alternative assumptions on future changes in labor force participation rates are included in the specification of the scenarios. The GSE scenario describes changes in population size and age structure if successful economic and environmental policies result in sustainable growth and cohesion policies are effective in reducing regional disparities.
Relatively large decreases in mortality are foreseen together with relatively large increases in fertility. Migration levels will also increase significantly. For all components of growth, regional differences will decrease substantially. The EME scenario shows the demographic development if policies focus on competition in the context of sustainable economic growth. Slightly less favorable developments in mortality and fertility are assumed to go hand in hand with large increases in migration and higher regional inequalities.
In times of low economic growth and growing environmental problems, the LSE scenario shows the consequences of effective cohesion policies. This future is characterized by relatively small decreases in mortality, constant fertility patterns, and declining migration levels. Regional inequalities in the drivers of population change are expected to decline, but not as much as in the GSE scenario.
Finally, in times of low economic growth where environmental challenges are not met, the CME scenario shows the demographic consequences of strong competitive goals. In terms of demographic and migratory drivers, this is the least favorable scenario with only slightly decreasing mortality, declining fertility, more or less constant migration levels, and increasing regional inequalities. The strengths of these policies will vary according to scenario and a strong effect is registered with a suitable phrase in the table. For example, in the mortality panel, under the GSE scenario, inequalities may fall substantially; under the EME scenario they will likely rise considerably.
These are qualitative judgements, which we now justify. Policies affecting the demographic components and an assessment of their influence in each policy scenario. The level of fertility may be affected by family-friendly policies such as subsidized day care or paid parental leave Neyer and Anderson Extra-European migration, especially from cultures that have a tradition of high fertility, may have an impact on the level of fertility as well Tromans et al.
Variations in fertility rates will be highest if policies are market-oriented and economic growth is high Kravdal ; Engelhardt et al. In the EME scenario, there will be pockets of regions with very high total fertility rates TFRs in the northern and western European countries and very low fertility rates in the southern, central, and eastern regions. If policies are oriented towards regional cohesion, these disparities narrow Lanzieri The GSE scenario assumes that family-friendly social welfare policies, which boost fertility rates in the northern countries, will also be pursued in other parts of Europe.
There is much literature that establishes the links between socio-economic deprivation, poor health, and premature mortality The Marmot Review ; Commission on Social Determinants of Health and there is a Europe-wide aim to decrease mortality rates and raise life expectancy through investment in healthcare services, research into disease control, and promotion of healthy lifestyles Rees et al.
In addition, policies may intervene to change lifestyle choices, such as smoking, drinking, and diet Doll et al. If policies are market-oriented and economic growth is low, there will be very large disparities between the longevity of populations in disadvantaged regions in the east and the longevity of advantaged regions in the west and north, as the CME scenario shows. The disparities are less pronounced if cohesion policies prevail.
Mortality rates may be more influenced by cohesion policy interventions than by market-oriented growth interventions. Yet in addition to changing trends in mortality through prevention and better health care, it is also important to be able to fund the acute treatment and social care needs of an older population, which are most often concentrated in a few years before death.
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These challenges could better be met through a focus on cost-effective growth in the high economic-growth scenarios. Massey et al. Most theories focus on push factors creating out-migration pressure in sending countries such as poverty, unemployment, and political turmoil, and pull factors emphasizing the importance of the attractiveness of receiving countries for in-migration.
Jennissen gives a general overview of economic determinants of international migration and stresses the importance of labor shortages for international migration patterns in Europe in the second half of the 20th century. If policies are market-oriented and the economy grows strongly, extra-European immigration is expected to be very high, especially to major cities or urban agglomerations.
If economic growth is high but policies focus on cohesion, this pattern is also seen, although it is not quite as strong. While a great influx of extra-European immigration will help many regions address demographic and labor market challenges, it will also require social policies to integrate a large group of immigrants into society as well as greater inter-state coordination in immigration policy.
In general, however, there are no European-wide policy actions for labor migrants. International migration will be high if economic growth is high and policies are market-oriented, as shown in the EME scenario. In contrast, if economic growth is low and policies focus on cohesion, international migration will be low the LSE scenario.
If high economic growth in the metropolitan centers of Europe continues, the result may be greater movement of job seekers from lagging regions of Europe into the already affluent regions. Migration in general will tend to benefit the already affluent regions by helping to address the problems of ageing and labor force shortages, but migration out of the poorer regions will only increase regional disparities. In order to promote territorial cohesion, increasing the attractiveness of regions falling behind is just as important, or more important, than boosting the competitiveness of already vibrant regions that benefit from migration.
Regional policy instruments such as the Structural Funds, Cohesion Funds and the Territorial Cooperation objective should be directed towards measures attracting and retaining younger persons in these areas and redressing the exodus from shrinking areas. Currently none of these programmes offers much direct incentive for migrants to stay in their origin regions CEC a. High economic growth will lead to a rise in labor force participation rates. If policies are aimed at reducing regional disparities in economic growth, economically weaker regions with low activity rates will catch up and approach the higher rates of the stronger regions.
If policies are market-oriented, high economic growth may lead to a general strong rise in the activity rates, but regional disparities become larger as stronger regions show higher rises. If economic growth is poor, activity rates will fall everywhere.
If there are policies to ease the economic pain of the weak regions, they catch up with the strong regions. If policies assume that the market has to do the work, this works fine for the economically stronger regions but not for the economically weaker regions. Disparities grow as weaker regions have to face a steeper fall in activity rates than stronger regions.
Policies can be aimed to raise labor force participation rates for young persons, women, immigrants, and older persons. Policies and attitudes towards full-time, part-time, and self-employment will affect the size of the labor force as well. National family policy can have a fundamental influence on the labor supply of women. Policy considerations to keep older workers in the labor force include reform of pension systems and retraining of older workers. Health policies should aim to maintain a healthy older, but vital workforce.
As changes in the size of the labor force are a product of changes in the size of the working-age population and labor force participation rates, policies affecting fertility, mortality, and migration will also have an impact on labor force trends. To compile the scenarios, we need to translate the qualitative scenarios into quantitative input parameters. In order to validate the contents of the four policy scenarios and to formulate assumptions on the effectiveness of policies associated with each scenario, an online expert questionnaire was designed. Participants of the ESPON open conference held at Prague in were invited to complete this web-based questionnaire.
The questionnaire was completed by 61 experts, including researchers, planners and geographers, with a high level of expertise in the field of demography, public policy, or public administration. The respondents represented countries more or less evenly spread over Europe.
The quantitative assumptions are partly based on the results of the expert opinion survey and partly based on recent trends in mortality, fertility, migration, and labor force participation. The summary drivers are translated into the region-specific rates or flows pro-rata, using the base period estimates adjusted up or down by greater or lesser amounts, depending on the scenario.
More details on the assumption setting for the different components are given below see also Rees et al. The quantitative fertility assumptions refer to trends in the TFR period. Changes in TFR not only refer to changes in the average number of children per woman but also to changes in the average age at childbirth Sobotka ; Kohler et al.
Aquaculture Development Trends in Europe
In these northern European countries, the fertility rise was driven by a catch-up among native-born women of postponed births and by higher contributions from foreign-born women as their numbers in the reproductive ages grew. Postponement of childbearing followed by catching up at higher ages as witnessed in the last decade in selected countries e. As a result, the level of fertility is likely to be fairly stable in the future. We assume that the catch-up process has been completed in the countries in which it has been experienced in the last decade and that catch-up will not start in those countries where it has not occurred.
In the policy scenarios, it is assumed that no major trends in the timing of fertility will happen in the future. For this reason, the distribution of standardized age-specific fertility rates is assumed to be constant. For fertility, the quantitative assumptions are based on a mix of perceived political actions in each scenario and the expected effectiveness of these policy measures derived from the expert opinion survey.
The assumed increase in TFR of 0.
Due to the absence of policies to stimulate fertility in general and to only modest financial contributions to support couples with fertility problems, a smaller positive effect on the TFR is apparent in the EME scenario. In the LSE scenario, positive effects of family-friendly policies are expected to be offset by liberal abortion laws, resulting in stable levels of fertility rates. In the CME scenario finally, the negative effect of the harsh economic and political climate is expected to lead to a decrease in fertility of up to 0.
National and regional mortality rates by age and sex were computed from a combination of data from the Human Mortality Database and Eurostat Assumptions have been based on the spatial pattern of mortality across Europe in the s and s. For regional comparisons, we used Europe standardized mortality ratios SMRs.
SMRs are more reliable than individual age- and sex-specific mortality rates ASMRs , which are subject to reporting or estimation errors. Each SMR is re-based to a Europe-wide average for the year in question, which is assigned a value of The trends in ASMR reduction in the years — were 2. As we assume policies favorable to mortality reduction for the GSE and EME scenarios, we assume an increased rate of mortality decline of 3.
Where there are fewer resources to advance improvements in health under the LSE and CME scenario, we assume an improvement of only 2. The mortality declines are assumed to operate uniformly across all ages from — to — From — to —, the rates of change are interpolated between the observed rates, which differ by age, and the target rates. This method was applied in the based national population projections by ONS The faster decline rates for male ASMRs mean that life expectancies of men catch up with those of women under all scenarios.
We computed SMRs for a region by dividing total deaths in a region by the sum of the European standard ASMRs multiplied by the estimated regional populations for each year from to We modify the dispersion of regional SMRs across Europe to reflect the trends built into the scenarios. To measure the dispersion, we use the range between the 95th and the 5th percentiles because this avoids the distorting effects of extreme outliers.
Thus, the age-sex profile shifts in two ways: first through variation across scenarios in the assumed Europe-wide decline rate and second through the assumed degree of convergence or divergence in the inter-regional variation. This provides a simple but powerful combination of drivers for our policy scenarios. If the GSE scenario proves correct, a more equal Europe will result in which the laggard regions have moved towards the average and the advanced regions have less advantage than at present.
The EME scenario moves regions further apart. Note that, even under the favorable trends assumed for the GSE scenario, there are still sizeable differences across Europe in the mortality experience of regional populations. Under the LSE scenario, there will be convergence in regional mortality and under the CME scenario there will be divergence. Within the EU people can migrate between countries with a minimum of regulations.
However, with respect to migration between Europe and the rest of the world, legal constraints play an important role. Given the fact that these two types of international migration happen in a completely differential judicial context, having major consequences on the amount and direction of migration flows, assumptions on these two types of migration have been made separately. The quality of migration statistics, however, varies strongly across countries and internationally consistent migration statistics are often missing.
As a result, there can be considerable differences in the reported size of the same migration flow by sending and receiving countries. For example, the number of emigrants from Poland to Germany reported by the Polish statistical office is considerably lower than the number of Polish immigrants reported by Germany.
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As our projections are prepared simultaneously for all countries included in the scenarios we need one consistent migration matrix between all regions in the model. The MIMOSA project compared migration statistics reported by sending and receiving countries for 31 European countries and estimated internationally consistent migration matrices showing migration flows between these countries for the years — The migration flows are distinguished by country of origin, country of destination, age, and sex.
Assumptions about immigration from the rest of the world are defined in absolute numbers, whereas assumptions about emigration from Europe are defined by emigration rates. In order to eliminate random fluctuations, the number of immigrants from the rest of the world for the base year of the projections was estimated by an average of the MIMOSA estimates for the years — This leads to a total number of 2. For the scenario period, the total number of immigrants is assumed to increase or decrease up to the year and kept constant after that year.
In the GSE scenario, with a moderate increase of immigration, the number of immigrants is assumed to rise to about 3. According to the EME scenario, the increase is higher: to 4. In the LSE scenario, a fall in immigration to 1. These age- and sex-specific numbers are related to population numbers in the base year in order to estimate emigration rates. Based on these rates, the level of extra-Europe migration in amounted to 1.
The scenarios assume different developments in the emigration rates. In the two economic prosperous scenarios, the GSE and EME scenarios, rising emigration rates are assumed, with the latter having a steeper rise. In the less prosperous scenarios, a decline is assumed, with the LSE scenario having a larger decrease than the CME scenario. Quantitative assumptions on intra - Europe migration are based on age- and sex-specific out-migration rates, i.
The quantitative assumptions about future levels of out-migration rates for international migration flows between countries within Europe follow similar patterns as extra-Europe emigration: rising rates for the GSE and EME scenarios and declining rates for the LSE and CME scenarios. The resulting number of intra-Europe migrants in counted 1. By the end of the projection period, 2. In order to make assumptions about the country of destination, a measure of regional attractiveness was used.
Attraction factors are assumed to change up to according to the convergence or divergence assumption in each scenario. In the final step, a regional distribution model was used to assign immigrants and emigrants to NUTS2 regions. This distribution is based on data provided by Eurostat and some National Statistical Offices NSOs , and in some cases completed with estimations.
The regional distribution of emigrants from sending countries and immigrants in receiving countries is kept constant during the scenario period. Apart from international migration, assumptions were made for internal migration. Internal migration is defined as the movement of population between NUTS2 regions within a single country. The remaining 23 countries have internal migration for between two and 39 NUTS2 regions. This variation and its potential to change over time due to social, economic, political, and climatic conditions were key components of the internal migration analysis.
For the 23 countries concerned, a comprehensive database of statistics has been produced, created from Eurostat sources, from a number of individual NSOs and in some cases through estimation. The objective has been to derive: 1 out-migration rates for the base period of the projections — for each combination of origin O , destination D , age A , and sex S within a single country, and 2 a series of assumptions to modify these base period out-migration rates over the full projection horizon — to — for each of the alternative scenarios.
Using the available time series of OD migration data for each country, the most recent trend in both migration flows and migration rates has been examined. The policy scenarios for internal migration are driven by adjustments to the relative attractiveness of individual destinations under varying assumptions.
The attractiveness of an individual NUTS2 region is measured using a destination attractiveness ratio DAR , which is calculated as the share of migration inflow divided by the share of population. Outlying values comprise a mixture of relatively small areas plus dominant destinations within a country for instance London in the UK. The level of internal out-migration rates remains unchanged, with scenarios modifying only the range of values and not the scale.
Once Article 50 is triggered, however, the clock starts ticking and we assume that the formal exit of the UK from the EU will happen at the latest on 1 April The exit negotiations will be difficult and potentially divisive, but are far less important than the negotiations on establishing a new formal relationship between the UK and the EU.
Substantive negotiations will only be possible once the UK government has defined what sort of relationship it wants with the EU There is virtually no chance of even the first two stages of this process to be concluded by the time of the UK exit.
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Unless an interim arrangement, which in all probability would have to be based on continued membership of the single market, is agreed prior to the exit date, the UK and the EU will be heading towards a "messy and hard exit", with potentially very disruptive effects for different economic sectors. It is now confirmed that the May government intends to take the UK out of the single market, which by any reasonable definition is a "hard Brexit". The best that can be achieved for business under these circumstances is probably a "slow but hard Brexit", which allows for adjustments during a longer period.
Economists agree that a hard Brexit would impose significant costs, primarily on the UK, but also on the economies of the EU, with their severity varying from sector to sector. Integrated production chains, for example in the aerospace and automotive industries, will face obvious difficulties. Businesses from all sectors should also watch what happens to the rules for data flows across the Channel. The refugee crisis abated after the EU-Turkey migration deal and the closure of the Balkan route in the spring of The influx into Italy has fuelled mounting concerns and dissatisfaction, which may have contributed to the referendum defeat and resignation of Prime Minister Renzi in December Although the number of asylum seekers in Germany fell to below , in according to preliminary estimates, down from almost , in , Germany still took in more refugees than the rest of the EU combined.
Three out of four Germans say they feel let down by their European partners. The seeming stability in the refugee and migrant situation is fragile. The future of the agreement between the EU and Turkey is not assured, given how much the mutual relationship has deteriorated in the past few months. Turkey feels that the EU did not acknowledge the serious threat posed by the failed coup attempt in July; that European countries are not doing enough to help fight the PKK terrorist group; and that the EU is not willing to deliver the visa freedom that Turkey craves.
The EU, on its part, is concerned about ever tougher restrictions on media freedom and civil liberties in Turkey and has criticized the extent of the post-coup crackdown. To increase its resilience in face of the fragile EU-Turkey agreement, the EU has decided on a number of measures to strengthen control of the external Schengen border and to move towards a genuinely common migration and asylum policy. This includes a dialogue with and outreach to the African countries in view of the migration pressures certain to come from there in the decades ahead. Although the situation remains precarious, we see less risk of chaos and collapse than last year.
Relocation inside the EU has largely failed, the African migration issue remains to be effectively addressed and the integration challenge, different in different countries, remains massive. But overall, the sense of acute crisis driven by the refugee and migration flows has abated. The focus has now shifted towards security and Islamist radicalization within individual EU countries. Although the total number of people killed by successive terrorist attacks in Europe remains relatively low, also in historical comparison, public concern remains very high, driving also important measures to remedy deficiencies in counter-terrorist cooperation among European countries.
Despite the Brexit shock, the economic situation in the EU and the Eurozone area has continued on its path of gradual improvement during the past year. Real economic activity is growing, thanks to strong consumption, the ECB's still very accommodating monetary policies, low oil prices and the weaker Euro. These forces should help produce growth of 1. There are, however, several risks clouding the economic outlook for Europe. Trade policy especially has emerged as a possible new crisis area for the EU in the years ahead. Since then, the European Court of Justice has ruled that any new trade agreement that goes beyond external tariff cuts, which is the case for all modern trade agreements, must be ratified not only by the European Parliament, but also by all national — and some sub-national — parliaments across the EU 39 in total.
Next in line to be ratified is the trade agreement with Singapore. Even a much less ambitious transatlantic agreement is not certain to be ratified, given widespread doubts about its possible impact on public services as well as environmental and food standards, particularly in Germany. Meanwhile, the long-term outlook for the Eurozone remains tainted by the seeming inability of two of its core members — France and Italy — to implement meaningful reforms. Both countries are now in election mode, and much will depend on the outcome of their respective polls. If Francois Fillon wins in France and a reinvigorated Matteo Renzi returns in Italy, prospects for reform and Eurozone stability will look good.